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Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is a nationwide federal assistance
program for aged, blind, and disabled individuals with low incomes. The
SSI program was enacted in 1972 and began paying beneﬁts in 1974, re-
placing a patchwork of state-run entitlement programs created under the
Social Security Act of 1935 and its amendments in 1950. The establishment
of SSI was the culmination of a four-year debate over a more overarching
welfare reform proposal—the Family Assistance Plan (FAP)—intended to
extend the federal social safety net to all low-income Americans. Although
Congress eventually rejected the universality of FAP, it passed SSI, a cate-
gorical welfare program based on the same negative income tax principles
as FAP but targeted on a subset of low-income individuals not expected to
work—the aged, blind, and disabled.
SSI began as a relatively small program providing beneﬁts to a largely
elderly population. Since that time SSI has grown to become the largest
federal means-tested cash assistance program in the United States, with a
caseload dominated by children and working-age adults with disabilities.
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Rapid program growth, the changing composition of SSI beneﬁciaries,
and increasing pressure to devolve federal responsibility for social pro-
grams to state governments, as well as to integrate traditional “non-
workers” into the labor market, have all raised questions about the role that
SSI plays in the broader U.S. social welfare system.
In 1972, those not expected to work included individuals aged sixty-ﬁve
and older, the blind, and people with disabilities. These categories have al-
ways been somewhat arbitrary and diﬃcult to establish and assess, partic-
ularly with regard to disability. But dramatic changes in social expectations
over who should work and who should be entitled to income transfers have
renewed the debate over whom SSI should serve. On the one hand, individ-
uals are living and working longer, and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) has granted people with disabilities a legal right to equal access to
employment, suggesting that the aged, blind, and disabled may be better
able to work than in the past. On the other hand, the normal retirement age
for Social Security beneﬁts is increasing, welfare reforms have placed lim-
its on the number of years single mothers with children may receive bene-
ﬁts in lieu of working, and poverty rates among children remain high.
These circumstances suggest that income maintenance programs like SSI
will play an increasingly important role in the U.S. social safety net. All
these factors will have an impact on the politically determined boundaries
of the only remaining federal cash-based means-tested entitlement pro-
gram without time limits available to both adults and children.
In this chapter we provide the basic information necessary for SSI policy-
makers to make informed choices about its future. In section 2.2 we review
the program’s history and describe the structure and evolution of SSI pro-
gram rules. In section 2.3 we provide expenditure, caseload, and program
recipient statistics. In section 2.4 we summarize the primary economic is-
sues related to the SSI program. In section 2.5 we review the empirical evi-
dence regarding these issues. We summarize our ﬁndings in section 2.6.
2.2 History and Structure of the SSI Program
The SSI program is a nationwide federal assistance program adminis-
tered by the Social Security Administration (SSA), which pays cash bene-
ﬁts to low-income individuals who are sixty-ﬁve years of age or older or
who are blind or disabled. The SSI program was enacted in 1972 and began
paying beneﬁts in 1974 replacing the state Old-Age Assistance, Aid to the
Permanently and Totally Disabled, and Aid to the Blind Programs created
by the Social Security Act of 1935 and its amendments in 1950. In this sec-
tion we review the history of the SSI program, describe current program
structure, eligibility criteria, and beneﬁt levels, and discuss how the pro-
gram’s goals and rules have evolved over time.
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The establishment of a federal income maintenance program for the
aged, blind, and disabled, SSI was the culmination of a four-year debate
that began with a more overarching welfare reform proposal, FAP, pro-
posed by President Nixon on 8 August 1969.1 FAP was the ﬁrst serious at-
tempt to institute a federal negative income tax program equivalent to
those proposed by Stigler (1946), Friedman (1962, 1968), and Tobin
(1969). FAP departed from existing welfare policy in three important ways:
(a) It was universal rather than categorical, with low income and assets as
the only eligibility criteria; (b) it was run through the federal tax system
rather than being administered by state and local governments; and (c) it
had a low beneﬁt reduction rate, in keeping with the notion that low tax
rates provide desirable work incentives.2
Congress eventually rejected the idea of an income maintenance pro-
gram for all Americans with low income but on 17 October 1972 created
the SSI program, a categorical welfare program targeted on the subset of
the poor who were aged, blind, or disabled. The SSI program passed after
FAP failed largely because Congress believed that providing income assis-
tance to needy individuals not expected to work was likely to have a much
smaller negative impact on employment than a universal negative income
tax program. In 1972, those not expected to work included individuals age
sixty-ﬁve and older, the blind, and people with disabilities, subgroups of
the population that already were targets of state-based assistance pro-
grams.
In keeping with some of the themes of FAP, the new SSI program feder-
alized beneﬁt administration, set minimum beneﬁt standards, imposed
uniform eligibility criteria, and set low beneﬁt reduction rates on labor
earnings. Legislative records suggest that SSI was intended to reduce vari-
ability in the types of individuals allowed onto the rolls and in the amount
of assistance they received, to make economic resources the only determi-
nant of eligibility for those meeting the categorical requirements, and to
provide incentives for beneﬁciaries to work to supplement their income
and move toward rehabilitation (U.S. House of Representatives, Commit-
tee on Ways and Means 1971).3,4 Thus, under SSI, Congress federalized
beneﬁt administration, set minimum beneﬁt standards, imposed uniform
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1. See Burke and Burke (1974) and Smeeding (1994) for a more detailed historical discus-
sion of how SSI became the nation’s ﬁrst negative income tax program.
2. The key features of most negative income tax (NIT) proposals are universality, federal
beneﬁt administration, and low beneﬁt reduction rates. For a fuller discussion of the origins
of NIT policy see Burkhauser and Finnegan (1989, 1993).
3. Most legislative models of the NIT, including FAP and SSI, impose both an income and
an asset test. Throughout this chapter we refer to income and assets as economic resources.
4. Under the former state-run programs the amount of assistance could vary from recipi-
ent to recipient according to an individual’s assessed needs, age, and living situation.eligibility criteria, and set relatively low beneﬁt reduction rates on labor
earnings. In addition to adopting some of the administrative mechanisms
of FAP, the SSI program began to blur the traditional ability-to-work stan-
dard for determining who should be entitled to public welfare payments.
By extending SSI beneﬁts to the needy families of children with disabilities,
Congress expanded the social safety net to include families headed by
adults who were “employable.”5,6
2.2.2 SSI Eligibility Criteria
As noted earlier, SSI is an income support program for low-income indi-
viduals who are aged, blind, or disabled. Thus, SSI eligibility is a function
of three program-based categorical criteria—age, disability, or blindness—
as well as more general requirements associated with income and asset lim-
its, and citizenship and residency rules. The SSA is responsible for screen-
ing applicants and making awards for SSI. Table 2.1 summarizes the SSI
eligibility requirements described in detail in the remainder of this section.
Means Tests
To be eligible for SSI, individuals must fall below federally mandated in-
come and asset limits. In 2002, the countable income limit was set at $780
per month ($9,360 per year) for individuals and $1,170 per month ($14,040
per year) for couples. The countable income limit is determined by the fed-
eral beneﬁt rate (FBR) and increases annually with the average U.S. wage
index. In general, the countable income limits fall just short of the U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau oﬃcial poverty thresholds.7 SSI applicants also must meet
countable asset limits. In 2002, asset limits were set at $2,000 for individu-
als and $3,000 for couples. Unlike the countable income limits, the asset lim-
its are not indexed for inﬂation. Thus, over time, countable asset limits for
SSI eligibility have become stricter. Countable asset limits were last changed
in 1989, rising from $1,500 for individuals and from $2,250 for couples.
As noted earlier, not all income received by individuals or couples is
countable. Exclusions include a $20 monthly income disregard for all
forms of income with the exception of means-tested income and an addi-
tional $65 monthly disregard for any labor income.8After these disregards,
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5. Poor children with disabilities had previously been included in state AFDC programs.
6. A ﬁnal category of people allowed onto the SSI rolls, despite their potential to ﬁnd al-
ternative private support, were noncitizens. By law, legal immigrants had to show income
sponsorship before immigrating to the United States. Largely due to the deﬁnition of income
in the SSI means test, the 1972 legislation allowed sponsored immigrants who were poor to
apply for SSI. This primarily aﬀected the SSI aged program.
7. For example, in 2001, the Census Bureau poverty threshold for all single-person house-
holds (under and over age sixty-ﬁve) was $754 per month ($9,044 per year). The countable in-
come cutoﬀ for SSI was $740 per month ($8,880 per year) in 2001.
8. In certain cases, impairment-related expenses may be deducted from this total. Also, in-
come is disregarded when it is used for Plans for Achieving Self Support (PASS).The Supplemental Security Income Program 83
Table 2.1 SSI Eligibility Requirements in 2002
Requirement Deﬁnition Exceptions/Exclusions
Limited incomea Countable income must be  Not all income counts.
• below $780 a month for single  Some exclusions are
adult or child • $20 per month of most income
• below $1,170 a month for  • $65 per month of wages and 
couple one-half of wages over $65
(In states that pay SSI supple- • food stamps
ments, countable income can be  • home energy/housing 
higher) assistance
Limited resourcesa (property  • $2,000 for single adult or child Not all resources count.
and other assets a person owns) • $3,000 for couple (limit applies  Some exclusions are
even if only one member is  • the home a person lives in
eligible) • a car, depending on use or 
value
•b urial plots for individual 
and immediate family
•b urial funds up to $1,500
• life insurance with face value 
of $1,500 or less
Citizenship/residenceb •r esides in one of the ﬁfty  Exception to residence: certain 
states, Washington, D.C., or  children of U.S. armed forces 
the Northern Mariana Islands;  personnel stationed abroad
and
•U .S. citizen or national; or
•c ertain American Indians; or
•l a wful permanent resident 
with forty work credits; or
•c ertain noncitizens with a 
military service connection; or
•c ertain refugee or asylum-type 
noncitizens during the ﬁrst 
seven years; or
•c ertain noncitizens in the 
United States or receiving SSI 
on 22 August 1996
(continued)
for every $1 in labor earnings a worker loses $0.50 in SSI beneﬁts. There-
fore, after all income disregards, an SSI recipient faces a 50 percent im-
plicit tax on labor earnings.9 Neither the income nor the asset exclusions
are indexed for inﬂation.
In-kind assistance from government programs like food stamps and
public housing are not counted as income against the individual’s overall
SSI beneﬁt. All other beneﬁts from government programs are taxed at 100
9. As we will discuss below, for those SSI beneﬁciaries receiving other means-tested pro-
gram beneﬁts, the eﬀective marginal tax on work can be much higher.percent. Countable resources include resources other than the home a per-
son lives in, a car (depending on use or value), and limited amounts of life
insurance and burial funds.10 In cases where an eligible individual resides
in a household with ineligible individuals, a portion of the other persons’
income is considered when determining the amount of the SSI payment.
This process, known as “deeming,” applies to married couples with one el-
igible member, parents of child applicants, and U.S. sponsors of noncitizen
applicants. The deeming rules are straightforward: If an individual or
couple is living in another person’s household and is receiving both food
and shelter from the person in the household, the federal beneﬁt rate is re-
duced by one-third.
Although the federal beneﬁt rate—and, thus, the monthly income test—
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Requirement Deﬁnition Exceptions/Exclusions
Categorical: sixty-ﬁve or older,  Meet only one of these: Person whose visual impairment 
blind or disabled; blind; disabled • age sixty-ﬁve or older is not severe enough to be con-
• corrected vision of 20/200 or  sidered blind may qualify under 
less in better eye the nonblind disability rules:
• ﬁeld of vision less than 20  • A job that pays $780 per 
degrees month ($1,300 if blind) is 
•p hysical or mental impairment  generally considered substan-
that keeps a person from per- tial work.
forming any “substantial” work  • Special work incentives allow 
and is expected to last twelve  some income and resources to 
months or result in death be excluded and permit pay-
•f or a child’s impairment, ment of special cash beneﬁts 
“marked and severe functional  or continuation of Medicaid 
limitations” expected to last  coverage even when a blind or 
twelve months or result in  disabled person is working.
death
Source: SSA (2002b).
aIf only one member of a couple is eligible, the income and resources of both are considered in deter-
mining eligibility. If a child under age eighteen is living with parents, the parents’ income and resources
are considered.
bIf a noncitizen has a sponsor who signed a legally unenforceable aﬃdavit of support (Immigration and
Naturalization Services [INS] form I-134), the sponsor’s income and resources are considered in deter-
mining eligibility and payment amount for three years following the date of lawful admission. (This rule
does not apply to noncitizens who become blind or disabled after legal admission for permanent resi-
dence or to noncitizens who are not lawful permanent residents.) If the sponsor signed the new legally
enforceable aﬃdavit of support (INS form I-864), the sponsor’s income and resources are considered un-
til the noncitizen acquires forty work credits or becomes a citizen. (This rule applies to noncitizens who
become blind or disabled after admission for permanent residence and to noncitizens who are not law-
ful permanent residents.)
10. In 2002, the dollar value on disregards on assets was $4,500 for a car or medical treat-
ment, $1,500 on life insurance, and $2,000 on personal property and household furnishings.rises with inﬂation each year, the monthly income disregards, the asset lim-
its, and the value of allowable assets (e.g., car, household eﬀects) are not in-
dexed, and thus have fallen substantially in real terms since SSI began. The
real decline in the income disregards and asset limits over time has eﬀec-
tively eroded the value of SSI beneﬁts and narrowed the population of po-
tential recipients relative to 1974 levels. Consider ﬁrst the 1972 set disre-
gards of $20 on all income and $65 on labor income. Valued in 2002
dollars, these disregards would be $84 and $275 per month, respectively.
Adjusting the asset limits for inﬂation discloses the same pattern. Valued
in 2002 dollars, the asset limits set in 1972 would be $6,345 for individuals
and $9,517 for couples,11 compared to the $2,000 and $3,000 limits cur-
rently in place. Thus, compared to when it was enacted in 1972, SSI now
covers a narrower and less economically advantaged portion of the income
distribution.
Citizenship and Residency Criteria
In addition to meeting the economic resource criteria, individuals also
must meet residency and citizenship requirements. To be eligible for SSI an
individual must be a resident of the United States and a U.S. citizen, a U.S.
national, or a “qualiﬁed alien” in an SSI-eligible noncitizen category.12The
current SSI-eligible noncitizen categories generally can be characterized as
covering individuals who were lawfully in the United States as of 22 August
1996, individuals who are refugees or in refugee-like situations, and indi-
viduals who have contributed to the country either by service in the mili-
tary or through extended periods of work. These relatively restrictive al-
lowances for noncitizens were implemented under 1996 welfare reform
(PRWORA) and were a direct response to concerns that newly arrived
noncitizens with immigration sponsors were increasingly applying for, and
receiving, SSI beneﬁts. The SSI provisions in the 1996 welfare reform act
generally excluded these individuals from receiving SSI by mandating that
the income of the noncitizen’s immigration sponsor be considered in the
means test.
Categorical Eligibility Criteria
Individuals meeting income, asset, and citizenship tests may qualify for
SSI beneﬁts based on three categorical criteria: age, blindness, or disabil-
ity. Applicants need only meet one of the three criteria, although some ap-
plicants ﬁt multiple categories. The categorical program requirements for
the aged and the blind are straightforward. Individuals are categorically el-
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11. Had the asset limits of $2,000 (individuals) and $3,000 (couples) set in 1989 kept up with
inﬂation, they would be $2,856 and $4,284, respectively, in 2002.
12. The term qualiﬁed alien is deﬁned in section 431 of Public Law (P.L.) 104-193, as
amended by P.L. 104-208 and P.L. 105-33. See Parrot, Kennedy, and Scott (1998) for a com-
plete listing of the qualifying criteria.igible for SSI based on age if they are age sixty-ﬁve or older. Individuals
may receive SSI beneﬁts for the blind if they have 20/200 vision or less with
the use of a correcting lens in their better eye, or if they have tunnel vision
of 20 degrees or less. These objective standards make for relatively easy and
uniform screening of aged and blind SSI applicants at oﬃces of the SSA
across the United States.13
In contrast, the disability screening process is more complex. First, there
is no simple deﬁnition of disability.14The most frequently applied model of
disability comes from Nagi (1965, 1969a, b, 1991). In the Nagi model, dis-
ability is a dynamic process in which an individual’s pathology interacts
with the socioeconomic environment.15 The dynamic nature of the disabil-
ity process is represented by the movement through three stages: pathol-
ogy, impairment, and disability. The ﬁrst stage, pathology, is the presence
of a physical or mental condition that interrupts the physical or mental
process of the human body. An example is deafness. This leads to the sec-
ond stage, impairment, which Nagi deﬁnes as “a physiological, anatomi-
cal, or mental loss or abnormality that limits a person’s capacity to func-
tion.” For example, deafness limits the ability to interpret sound. The ﬁnal
stage, disability, is an inability to perform or a limitation in performing
roles and tasks that are socially expected. For example, a person with deaf-
ness is unable to use the telephone. Under the Nagi model, those with a
pathology that causes a physical or mental impairment that subsequently
limits one or more life activities—such as work—but who nevertheless
work would not be considered to have a work disability.16 (This is the case
whether work was possible through changes in the work environment, ac-
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13. Although the measurement of these “objective standards” is relatively straightforward,
the justiﬁcation for using them as standards for inability to work is less so. A literature exists
that argues that categorical age is not a useful measure of ability to work. A parallel literature
exists that suggests that functional ability rather than medical condition is a superior criterion
for determining ability to work (Library of Congress 1998; Wunderlich, Rice, and Amado
2002).
14. Mashaw and Reno (1996) argue that the appropriateness of any deﬁnition of disability
depends on the purpose for which it is used. They document over twenty deﬁnitions of dis-
ability used for purposes of entitlement to public or private income transfers, government ser-
vices, or statistical analysis. In the ADA of 1990, disability is deﬁned as a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, a record of such an im-
pairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment. La Plante (1991) provides a use-
ful discussion of alternative deﬁnitions that can be used to estimate this population.
Burkhauser, Houtenville, and Wittenburg (forthcoming) provide detailed analyses of diﬀer-
ent deﬁnitions of disability in national representative U.S. surveys.
15. The World Health Organization (WHO) has a model of disability very similar to that of
Nagi. The key to both of these deﬁnitions is the recognition that individuals move from the
presence of a health condition to a point where it begins to impinge on activities that are so-
cially expected of them and that this movement is related to the environment in which indi-
viduals live. See Jette and Badley (2002) for an excellent comparison of the Nagi and WHO
models.
16. This measure closely resembles what Verbrugge (1990) calls social disability, or the in-
tersection of an individual’s physical impairment (e.g., deafness) and the environmental chal-
lenges of the activities required by a social role, such as work.cess to rehabilitation, or individual adaptability.)17 The ﬁrst component is
the presence of a pathology—a physical or mental malfunction, or the in-
terruption of a normal process, or both. This leads to a second component,
an impairment, which Nagi deﬁnes as a physiological, anatomical, or men-
tal loss or abnormality that limits a person’s capacity and level of function.
The ﬁnal component of disability is deﬁned as an inability to perform, or a
limitation in performing, socially expected roles and tasks. For men and,
increasingly, for women of working age, market work is a socially expected
role. Hence, those who are unable to perform or are limited in their ability
to work are considered disabled.
The disability determination process for SSI incorporates some of the
reasoning put forth in Nagi’s disability deﬁnition. Applicants for disability
beneﬁts move through a multistep process in which their pathology, im-
pairment, and level of functioning are judged. Applicants thought to be
unable to engage in any substantial work become eligible for beneﬁts. Be-
low we describe the process of disability determination for both adults and
children applying for SSI disability beneﬁts.
Like the aged and blind, persons seeking disability beneﬁts also apply at
an oﬃce of the SSA. Once the federal oﬃcials and the applicant have gath-
ered suﬃcient information to complete the application, it is submitted to a
state agency for determination of disability. State disability examiners,
working with vocational and medical consultants, act as the primary gate-
keepers of both SSI and Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI).18Dis-
ability decisions are made by state agencies acting under contract to the
federal government. Therefore, although disability eligibility criteria are
uniform across the country, the interpretation of these criteria, and hence
the disability determination process itself, can and does systematically
vary from state to state and over time. Table 2.2 shows diﬀerences in mean
allowance rates (initial acceptances to initial applications), by state be-
tween 1974 and 1993. As the table indicates, mean allowance rates vary
considerably across states, ranging from lows of 28 in Louisiana and New
Mexico to highs of 48 in Delaware, New Jersey, and Rhode Island.
Disability Screening for Adults
SSA deﬁnes adult disability as the inability to engage in substantial gain-
ful activity by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental im-
pairment that is expected to result in death or last at least twelve months.
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17. For example, a person with deafness who is accommodated at the workplace with a
Telephone Typewriter machine that permits him or her to use the telephone.
18. SSDI is a social insurance program that provides payments to individuals who have
paid Social Security taxes for the appropriate number of quarters and who are judged to be
disabled under the SSA guidelines. Unlike SSI, it is not means-tested. However, it does have
restrictions on labor earnings consistent with its criteria for disability eligibility. See Bound
and Burkhauser (1999) for a fuller discussion of this program from an economic perspective.Table 2.2 Mean Disability Allowance Rates by State, 1974–93



























New Hampshire 42 5.5
New Jersey 48 9.4
New Mexico 28 5.3
New York 41 9.2
North Carolina 40 6.1





Rhode Island 48 4.7
South Carolina 37 4.7











Source: Burkhauser et al. (1999).
Notes: The mean allowance rate for a state is deﬁned as the mean of the state’s yearly initial
acceptance to initial application ratio for the years 1974–93. Allowance rates are based on
SSDI applications and acceptances.Applicants must be unable to do any work that exists in the national econ-
omy for which they are qualiﬁed by virtue of age, education, and work ex-
perience. The United States does not award federal disability beneﬁts for
partial disability.19
As a practical matter, SSA asks the state disability determination oﬃces
to follow a ﬁve-step procedure in their initial disability determination.20
First, the examiners check to see if applicants are currently working and
making more than the “substantial gainful activity” (SGA) amount—
$780 a month in 2002. If so, their application is denied. As can be seen in
ﬁgure 2.1, almost no cases are rejected in this manner, since presumably the
SSA ﬁeld oﬃces have already checked to see if applicants are working be-
fore they send applications to the disability determination oﬃce.21Second,
the state disability examiners determine if the applicant has a severe im-
pairment that is expected to last twelve months or result in death. If not,
the application is denied. About 20.1 (13   7) percent of all applicants
were denied at this step in 2000. Third, the state disability examiners look
to see if the impairment meets the medical listings. If the impairment is
listed, applicants pass the categorical screening for disability. If the im-
pairment is judged to be equivalent to one of the medical listings, then ap-
plicants also meet the categorical requirement for beneﬁts. Most recipients
who pass the disability screening do so at this stage because their impair-
ment either meets or equals one on the medical listing (22 percent of all ap-
plicants were approved at this step in 2000).
Fourth, if a decision cannot be reached on medical factors alone, appli-
cants are evaluated in terms of residual functional capacity. If they are
found to be able to meet the demands of “past relevant work” their claim
is denied (20 percent of all applicants were denied at this step in 2000). If
individuals are deemed unable to do past relevant work, examiners deter-
mine if the impairment prevents the applicant from doing any other work.
Here vocational factors are considered. If, for example, applicants’ maxi-
mum sustained work capacity is limited to sedentary work and they are at
least age ﬁfty to ﬁfty-four, with less than a high school education and no
skilled work experience, then they would be considered disabled and pass
the categorical screening. In contrast, if applicants’ previous employment
experience includes skilled work, then they would not receive beneﬁts. At
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19. However, as will be shown later, in some instances the SSI program allows individuals
with disabilities to exceed the earnings limit and continue to receive SSI beneﬁts, making it
a type of partial disability insurance. Most other western industrialized countries provide
partial disability beneﬁts to their working-age populations. For a discussion of disability
program rules in other western industrialized nations see Aarts, Burkhauser, and deJong
(1996).
20. Our discussion of the adult disability determination process draws heavily on Bound
and Burkhauser (1999).
21. The percentages in ﬁgure 2.1 are based on outcomes from initial SSDI applications, the
data available from published sources. However, there is no reason to believe that the patterns
for SSI would be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.this stage, 16 percent of all applicants were determined eligible for beneﬁts
and 22 percent were denied beneﬁts in 2000.
Applicants who are denied beneﬁts can ask for a reconsideration. Their
ﬁle will then be reviewed by a second team of examiners. If they are rejected
after reconsideration, individuals may appeal the case to an administrative
law judge. It is at this stage that applicants will for the ﬁrst time come face
to face with a gatekeeper. Individuals denied beneﬁts at this stage may ap-
peal the decision to the Social Security Appeals Council and then to the
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Fig. 2.1 SSA initial disability determinations, sequential decision-making process,
and outcomes of decisions on initial SSDI applications, 2000
Source: Authors’ calculations using SSA Oﬃce of Disability data, SSA-831 Disability Deci-
sion ﬁle.
aThis response includes 5 percent of claims that were denied because the applicant failed to
cooperate in obtaining evidence needed for the claim. The other 8 percent were denied for
“impairment not severe.”district courts. In 2001, about 33 percent of those initially denied beneﬁts
appealed the decision. About 10 percent of those who appealed the deci-
sion eventually were awarded beneﬁts (SSA SSI Annual Statistical Report,
2002b).22 For the claimants who are allowed beneﬁts at the initial level or
who do not appeal, the application and decision process usually takes a
few months. For those who appeal to the administrative law judge, the pro-
cess can take a year or more.
Disability Screening for Children
Screening children for disability eligibility has proven to be even more
complex and contentious than adult disability screening. When the SSI
program was originally considered, Congress recognized the potential
diﬃculties of applying the standard SSA disability deﬁnition to children.
Thus, under the original legislation, Congress wrote that a child should be
considered disabled if “he suﬀers from any medically determinable physi-
cal or mental impairment of comparable severity” to a disabling impair-
ment in an adult (SSA 1997). In practice, children originally qualiﬁed for
SSI if they had “a medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which results in marked and severe functional limitations, and which can
be expected to result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” Between 1974 and
1989 the child disability determination process did not include a functional
assessment or take into account the equivalent of adult vocational factors.
See ﬁgure 2.2 for a comparison of the child and adult initial disability de-
termination process.
This changed in 1990, when the Supreme Court decided the case of Sul-
livan v. Zebley. The court ruled that in order to meet the standard of equal
treatment, a functional limitation component parallel to that of adults
must be included in the initial disability determination process for chil-
dren. In response, SSA added two new bases for ﬁnding children eligible
for beneﬁts: (a) functional equivalence, which was set at the medical listing
level of the disability determination process, and (b) an individual func-
tional assessment (IFA), which was designed to be parallel with the func-
tional and vocational assessment provided for adults. By allowing appli-
cants who did not meet the medical listing to be found disabled if their
impairments were severe enough to limit their ability to engage in age-
appropriate activities, such as attending school, the IFA lowered the level
of severity required for children to be eligible for SSI beneﬁts (U.S. GAO
1994, 1995).23
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22. There is some evidence that the proportion of claimants who appeal and the proportion
of decisions that get reversed rise and fall with the percentage of initial denials (Lando, Cut-
ler, and Gamber 1982).
23. Following the Zebley decision a large number of previously denied cases were re-
assessed and awarded disability beneﬁts. This can be seen in the caseload statistics presented













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































yIn 1996, as part of welfare reform, Congress modiﬁed the deﬁnition of
disability for children. Legislators replaced the comparable severity (to
adults) criterion with a deﬁnition of disability that is unique to children.
Under the new deﬁnition, a child’s impairment—or combination of im-
pairments—is considered disabling only if “it (they) results in marked and
severe functional limitations, is expected to result in death or has lasted
or can be expected to last at least 12 months” (SSA 1996). The new focus
on assessing the severity of impairments among children was reﬂected in
changes in the evaluation process. The legislation removed the IFA, re-
placing it with a criterion based on functional equivalence or evaluations
of the extent to which impairments create medical listing–level severity.
The revised rules deﬁned medical listing–level severity for functional limi-
tations as (a) marked limitations in two broad areas of functioning, such as
social functioning or personal functioning, or (b) extreme limitations in
one area of functioning, such as inability to walk (SSA 1997). In practice
these changes meant that although functional limitations continued to in-
clude behavior-related limitations, they no longer covered the same
breadth of functioning included in the IFA. For example, Congress specif-
ically removed maladaptive behavior disorder from the functional listing
criteria. Thus, the post-1996 standard represents a broader measure of dis-
ability than originally applied to children, but a narrower standard than
the one used between 1990 and 1996 (see ﬁgure 2.2).
2.2.3 SSI Beneﬁts
Federal Beneﬁt Levels
Each eligible SSI beneﬁciary in his or her own household with no other
countable income received a federal cash payment of $545 per month in
2002 ($817 for jointly eligible couples). The federal SSI beneﬁt is increased
each January by the cost-of-living index used to adjust all Social Security
Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) beneﬁts. Although
the original objective of the SSI program was to guarantee an income at the
poverty level, from the beginning the federal minimum SSI beneﬁt was set
below the oﬃcial Bureau of the Census poverty line. Excluding state sup-
plementation, SSI payments represent about 75 percent of the poverty
threshold for an eligible individual, and about 90 percent of the threshold
for an eligible couple; these percentages have remained relatively constant
over time.24
SSI recipients are required by law to apply for every government pro-
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24. This diﬀerence arises in part because the SSI program and the U.S. poverty thresholds
assume diﬀerent economies of scale. The SSI program assumes that a single person needs 67
percent of the couple beneﬁt to be equally well oﬀ; the U.S. poverty threshold assumes that a
single person needs 80 percent of the couple beneﬁt to maintain an equivalent standard of liv-
ing.gram for which they may be eligible. In most states, recipients receive state
supplemental payments and become eligible for Medicaid and food stamps
without making a separate application.25,26 Since 1986 SSI beneﬁts and el-
igibility for Medicaid have been continued for those who earn above the
SGA; this is known as 1619(b) status.27In general, the special eligibility test
for Medicaid applies if the individual has earnings over the level that oﬀsets
his or her SSI beneﬁts but is still lower than a threshold amount established
in the state in which he or she resides.28 Adult SSI recipients with disabili-
ties also are eligible for federally funded, state-administered vocational re-
habilitation.29
State Supplementation
In designing the SSI program Congress recognized that states may want
to boost beneﬁt levels beyond the federal program. In addition, Congress
wanted to ensure that those states paying above the federal level in 1972
would continue to provide the same level of assistance as they had prior
to the federalization of SSI. As a result of these two goals, there are two
types of state supplementation for SSI: mandatory and optional.30 Under
mandatory supplementation, states whose Old-Age Assistance and Aid
to the Permanently and Totally Disabled beneﬁts were greater than the
federal minimum had to make up the diﬀerence in mandatory state sup-
plements.31 Although nearly every state was subject to mandatory sup-
plementation in 1972, increases in federal beneﬁt levels over the years
have left only a few SSI beneﬁciaries receiving mandatory payments to-
day.
In 2000, forty-ﬁve states and the District of Columbia provided optional
supplemental beneﬁts (columns [1–3], table 2.3). States oﬀering supple-
ments can follow the same rules as the federal SSI program and have the
program administered by SSA, or they can administer their own program
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25. We discuss states’ latitude in determining Medicaid eligibility for SSI recipients later in
this section.
26. In most cases, individuals who are eligible for SSI are categorically eligible for food
stamps. The exceptions to this general rule are SSI beneﬁciaries living in households where
other members do not receive and are not applying for SSI. These individuals must apply for
food stamps at the local food stamp oﬃce and meet the household income test to obtain food
stamp eligibility.
27. In 1995, only about 46,000 (1.3 percent) of the 3.5 million SSI disability recipients were
in 1619(b) status (Mashaw and Reno 1996).
28. In making this determination, the SSA takes the average expenditures on Medicaid and
SSI (including state SSI) and compares this amount to an individual’s earnings.
29. The Ticket to Work/Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 expanded the eligible
pool of vocational rehabilitation providers available to disabled SSI recipients by allowing
beneﬁciaries to receive vocational rehabilitation services from not-for-proﬁt and for-proﬁt
vendors. The ﬁrst tickets from this program were issued in 2002.
30. For a detailed description of state supplementation see Ponce (1996).














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.and use state-speciﬁc eligibility criteria. Despite the apparent cost advan-
tage to federal administration, states have increasingly opted for state ad-
ministration of supplemental payments. About three-quarters of states
providing optional supplementation administer their own programs or
jointly administer them with the federal government. Only eleven states
rely solely on federal administration.
Although a majority of states have optional supplementation programs,
a number of factors minimize the importance of these programs. First, only
twenty-three states provide supplements to the vast majority of SSI recip-
ients living independently in their own households.32 In the remaining
states with optional programs, supplements are paid only to the minority
of SSI recipients living in institutions.33Second, because state supplements
are not annually adjusted for inﬂation, the real value of the median state
supplemental payment to individuals living independently declined by
about 60 percent between 1975 and 1997.34
That being said, public concern over states’ reducing their SSI supple-
mental payments when federal beneﬁt levels rise led Congress to mandate
that states pass along SSI beneﬁt increases resulting from annual cost-of-
living adjustments. States may meet this passalong requirement by main-
taining payment levels year to year (the payment levels method) or they
may spend the same amount of money in the aggregate that they spent the
year before the federal beneﬁt rose (the total expenditure method). In 2002,
forty states used the payment levels method and ten states used the expen-
ditures method (columns [4–5], table 2.3).
Coordination with Other Programs
In addition to SSI federal and state cash payments, SSI beneﬁciaries fre-
quently gain automatic eligibility to Medicaid and Food Stamp programs.
Generally, SSI recipients are categorically eligible for Medicaid. A state
may either use SSI eligibility criteria for determining Medicaid eligibility,
or it may use its own criteria as long as the criteria are no more restrictive
than the state’s January 1972 medical assistance standards.35 Forty states
use SSI criteria and eleven states use eligibility criteria more restrictive
than those of the SSI program (see columns [6–7], table 2.3). States may
also enter into agreements with SSA to make Medicaid eligibility determi-
nations for them, based on the federal SSI criteria; thirty-three states have
such contracts with SSA (column [8], table 2.3).
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32. Over 90 percent of SSI recipients live in their own households (U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, Committee on Ways and Means 1998).
33. One explanation for the ongoing supplementation of SSI recipients living in institutions
is that supplementary SSI payments provide states with a mechanism of supporting such fa-
cilities.
34. Over time some states have even reduced the nominal value of supplemental payments.
35. This ﬁnal option is known as the 209(b) option.With the exception of California, SSI recipients in all states may be eli-
gible for food stamps.36 The SSA oﬃces notify applicants and recipients of
SSI of their potential eligibility for food stamps. Eligibility for the Food
Stamp Program is determined by the food stamp oﬃce.
Finally, thirty-eight states (column [9], table 2.3) have agreements with
SSA to be reimbursed for basic needs assistance provided during the pe-
riod during which an eligible individual’s SSI application for beneﬁts was
pending, or an individual’s SSI beneﬁts were suspended and subsequently
reinstated.
2.2.4 Administration and Financing
As a federal income maintenance program, SSI is funded from general
revenues and is administered by the SSA. Although, as discussed earlier,
many states supplement federal beneﬁt levels, over time the share of sup-
plemental beneﬁts paid by states has declined. In 1975, state SSI expendi-
tures accounted for approximately 27 percent of total SSI payments. In
2001, state supplemental payments amounted to about 11 percent of an-
nual SSI expenditures (SSA 2002a).37
2.2.5 Summary
Although the goals of the SSI disability program have not changed
since its inception in 1974, its structure has been subject to numerous leg-
islative, administrative, and court actions. These actions have primarily
focused on making the disability criteria more target eﬀective and on en-
hancing incentives aimed at returning recipients to the workforce. For the
child disability component of the program, changes have focused on pro-
viding an appropriate vocational criterion for children that does not un-
duly discourage rehabilitation and school success. Notably, there have
been few changes to the means test criteria and no adjustment for inﬂa-
tion in these criteria, meaning that over time, the amount of income that
will disqualify one for SSI has fallen in real terms, or, simply put, the
means test has become more restrictive. Finally, other legislative eﬀorts
have centered on limiting the eligibility of noncitizens. The legislative
history of SSI shows that the primary mechanisms used by policymakers
to alter the coverage and the generosity of SSI have been changes in the
categorical eligibility criteria, rather than changes in the size of SSI ben-
eﬁts.
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36. California cashes out food stamps, and SSI recipients in California receive a cash pay-
ment in their state supplementary payment in lieu of food stamps.
37. The numbers reported reﬂect the average for all states. Looking across states, in Janu-
ary 1999, the federal share of the maximum SSI beneﬁt ranged from 58 percent in Alaska and
74 percent in California to 100 percent in the eight jurisdictions without a supplemental pro-
gram (CRS 1999).2.3 Program Statistics
2.3.1 Trends in Expenditures, Caseloads, and Beneﬁts
The SSI program has grown substantially in both recipients and expen-
ditures since it ﬁrst paid beneﬁts in 1974. However, its growth has varied
over time (ﬁgure 2.3). Between 1974 and 1982, caseloads fell by 4.5 percent
and real federal expenditures declined by about 15 percent. This decline
caused concern among policymakers that too few potentially eligible re-
cipients were enrolling (Menefee, Edwards, and Schieber 1981). After this
slow start, the number of SSI beneﬁciaries increased steadily until 1996,
growing from roughly 3.9 million in 1982 to 6.6 million in 1996, a 70 per-
cent increase. Federal payments for the program rose even faster during
this period, with the greatest growth between 1989 and 1992. Valued in
2001 dollars, total annual payments increased from $17.6 billion in 1982 to
$32.5 billion in 1996, an increase of about 85 percent. Between 1996 and
2001 (the last year of data available) caseloads and expenditures have risen
by less than 2 percent. Despite rapid growth in the SSI program over time,
as a percentage of total federal outlays SSI expenditures have remained rel-
atively stable at 1.9 percent since the program began in 1974.
2.3.2 Trends in Characteristics of Recipients
Originally considered a program for the elderly, SSI is now dominated by
adults and children with disabilities. Figure 2.4 shows the age composition
of SSI beneﬁciaries between 1974 and 2001. In 1974, the majority of the
SSI caseload was over the age of sixty-ﬁve. The number of aged beneﬁciar-
ies peaked at 2.5 million in 1975, gradually dropped to around 2 million in
1982, and remains at about that level. In contrast, the number of blind and
disabled adults (aged eighteen to sixty-four) on SSI has more than doubled
since 1974, with the most rapid growth occurring after 1982.38 In Decem-
ber 2001, 3.8 million adults aged eighteen to sixty-four received SSI bene-
ﬁts, about 2.1 million more than in 1982. The number of blind and disabled
recipients who are under age eighteen has also grown substantially in re-
cent years.39 Between 1974 and 1989 the child caseload increased to about
185,000. However, following the Zebley decision in 1990, the number of
blind and disabled children rose rapidly, reaching 955,000 by 1996.40 Since
then, child SSI rolls have declined slightly, falling to 881,000 in 2001.
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38. This growth is almost entirely due to increases in the number of disabled beneﬁciaries.
The number of working-age SSI recipients eligible due to blindness has remained relatively
constant over time (SSA Annual Statistical Supplement, various years).
39. Again, the growth is almost entirely explained by increases in the number of disabled
children.
40. As noted earlier, this increase was due both to the reassessment of previously denied
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As a result of rapid growth in adult and child disabled beneﬁciaries, the
SSI population looks dramatically diﬀerent today from the way it did when
the program was created. In 1974, blind and disabled adults and children
comprised only 40 percent of the SSI population. In 2001, over 70 percent
of SSI beneﬁciaries were disabled individuals under the age of sixty-ﬁve.
Table 2.4 shows that other key demographic characteristics have also
changed since the program’s inception.41 The ﬁrst section of the table
shows the age, gender, and citizenship composition of all SSI recipients.
Since 1975, the proportion of males has increased. In 1976, more than two-
thirds of SSI recipients were female. In 2001, about 60 percent of SSI re-
cipients were female. Another notable change in the composition of the
SSI population has been the rapid increase in the number of noncitizens re-
ceiving beneﬁts. In 1982, the ﬁrst year for which records on citizenship
were kept, a little over 3 percent of all SSI recipients were noncitizens. In
1994, two years before citizenship became a requirement for new appli-
cants, about 12 percent of all SSI beneﬁciaries were noncitizens. This per-
centage fell slightly once the citizenship restrictions were imposed, but
noncitizen beneﬁciaries remain a sizable component of the SSI popula-
tion—10.4 percent in 2001.
Table 2.4 Trends in Key Characteristics of SSI Beneﬁciaries, 1975–2001
1975 1984 1987 1990 1992 1994 1996 2001
All SSI Recipients
Age
Less than 18 2.5 5.3 5.7 6.4 10.0 13.4 14.4 13.2
18 to 64 39.4 44.2 48.3 50.9 52.3 53.0 54.0 57.0
65 and above 58.1 50.6 46.0 42.7 37.7 33.7 31.6 29.8
Gender
Male 35.5 34.8 36.1 37.2 39.0 41.1 41.5 41.7
Female 64.2 65.1 63.9 62.8 61.0 58.9 58.5 58.2
Citizenship
Noncitizens n.a. 4.5 6.4 9.0 10.8 11.7 11.0 10.4
Disabled SSI Recipients 
(under age 65)
Qualifying Diagnosis
Physical n.a. n.a. 49.0 47.0 44.7 42.2 41.3 39.0
Mental Retardation n.a. n.a. 26.9 26.6 27.1 27.6 27.5 25.0
Psychiatric Disorder n.a. n.a. 24.1 26.4 28.2 30.2 31.2 36.0
Source: SSI Annual Statistical Report (SSA 2002b).
Note: n.a. indicates information is not available.
41. Notably, race is not included in the table. Information on the racial composition of SSI
beneﬁciaries in the 1998 Green Book showed an increase in the number of Latinos enrolled in
the program over time. These data also showed that African Americans are disproportion-
ately represented among child and adult disabled beneﬁciaries. Unfortunately, there are no
comparable data on race after 1995.The second section of table 2.4 shows trends in the three main qualifying
diagnostic categories—physical impairments, mental retardation, and
psychiatric disorders other than mental retardation—for SSI recipients
with disabilities (adults and children). In the early years of the program,
less than one-quarter of SSI beneﬁciaries qualiﬁed on the basis of psychi-
atric disorders other than mental retardation. Following expansions in the
eligibility criteria for mental impairments in both adults and children, the
number of adults and children qualifying for SSI on the basis of a mental
impairment began to grow. As a result, in 2001, 36 percent of all SSI re-
cipients qualiﬁed on the basis of mental impairments other than mental re-
tardation.
2.3.3 SSI Participation
An important policy concern with respect to all public assistance pro-
grams is the degree of participation among eligible individuals—that is, of
the people who meet the categorical, economic resource, and citizenship
tests, what proportion is receiving SSI beneﬁts. It is relatively straight-
forward to make such calculations for those aged sixty-ﬁve and older, and
a literature exists on this question. Unfortunately, the diﬃculties of estab-
lishing and assessing disability for adults and children not only make it
diﬃcult for policymakers and administrators to accurately determine SSI
eligibility for those who apply, but also make it diﬃcult for researchers to
calculate program participation rates that require some estimate of the el-
igible disabled population that does not apply for beneﬁts. Existing na-
tionally representative data sources lack suﬃcient information on either
economic characteristics or health characteristics to generate precise esti-
mates of the population eligible for the disability components of SSI. As a
result, there is almost no research on SSI participation rates among the el-
igible population with disabilities.42
In table 2.5 we provide a preliminary approximation of take-up rates for
SSI that we believe is useful in establishing broad trends. We use the oﬃcial
U.S. Bureau of the Census poverty calculations and show the share of SSI
recipients in age-based poverty populations. This method was used in the
1998 Green Book for the population aged sixty-ﬁve and older. On the one
hand, because our estimates do not account for citizenship, assets, and
especially disability status, they will understate program participation
among those in the poverty population who are eligible. On the other hand,
since those eligible for SSI may have household incomes above the oﬃcial
poverty line, our approximations may overstate program participation
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42. It is possible to estimate the population with some level of disability using national data
sources (see Bound and Burkhauser 1999 for examples). It is much more diﬃcult to isolate the
subpopulation within this broader category that would meet the medical listing or vocational
criteria for SSI eligibility.104 Mary C. Daly and Richard V. Burkhauser
among all eligible households. Nonetheless, the trends in table 2.5 are re-
vealing of how SSI is being used by low-income persons.
As the ﬁrst column of table 2.5 shows, the participation rate among the
poor elderly declined from 78.5 percent in 1974 to 53.6 percent in 1982.
Since then, participation rates have ﬂuctuated from year to year but have
remained well below the highs recorded in the early years of the program.
In general, no more than two-thirds of elderly individuals living in poverty
receive SSI beneﬁts. More complete measures of participation suggest that
take-up rates among the elderly are lower than the gross measures indicate.
Table 2.5 SSI Participation Rates among Poor, 1974–98, by Age Group
Disability
Prevalence Take-Up Rates
65+ 18–64   18 18–64
1974 78.5 14.8 0.7 —
1975 75.6 14.8 1.0 —
1976 72.3 15.0 1.2 —
1977 74.1 15.3 1.4 —
1978 71.3 15.4 1.7 —
1979 61.0 14.4 1.7 —
1980 57.4 12.5 1.6 20.3
1981 55.1 11.0 1.6 19.2
1982 53.6 9.7 1.4 17.4
1983 55.3 9.6 1.4 17.5
1984 61.2 10.5 1.6 19.3
1985 58.8 11.3 1.7 19.0
1986 58.0 12.6 1.9 19.2
1987 56.6 13.4 2.0 18.8
1988 57.6 13.9 2.0 18.7
1989 60.3 14.8 2.1 19.6
1990 56.3 14.9 2.3 19.7
1991 55.0 15.0 2.8 18.9
1992 53.5 15.5 3.6 19.3
1993 56.3 15.9 4.6 20.4
1994 57.9 17.5 5.5 21.4
1995 63.7 18.9 6.3 19.9
1996 61.0 19.1 6.6 20.7
1997 60.8 19.7 6.2 21.3
1998 60.0 20.7 6.6 21.3
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Current Population Survey.
Notes: Dashes indicate data not available. Take-up rates are calculated as the number of SSI
recipients divided by the number in poverty in each age group. Data for take-up rates are from
the SSA and the Census Bureau. Disability prevalence is calculated as the percentage of the
poverty population eighteen to sixty-four years of age answering “yes” to the Current Popu-
lation Survey question: “(Do you/Does anyone in this household) have a health problem or
disability which prevents (you/them) from working or which limits the kind or amount of
work (you/they) can do?” This question was not asked of children.The Supplemental Security Income Program 105
Researchers consistently ﬁnd the participation rate among persons eligible
for SSI aged beneﬁts at between 45 and 60 percent (Menefee, Edwards, and
Schieber 1981; Warlick 1982; Coe 1985; Shields et al. 1990; McGarry 1996).
The remaining columns in table 2.5 show SSI participation rates for poor
adults aged eighteen to sixty-four and poor children. Consistent with the
caseload growth highlighted in ﬁgure 2.4, participation rates among poor
working-age adults and children have risen over time. Participation rates
among poor adults rose from 14.8 percent in 1974 to 20.7 percent in 1998,
with the most rapid increases occurring during the 1990s. Recipiency rates
for poor children also increased rapidly during the 1990s, rising from 2.1
percent in 1989 to 6.6 percent in 1998. As column (4) shows, the prevalence
of disability has not risen since 1980, which suggests that the increase in
SSI take-up rates among the poor is not a function of increased disability.
2.3.4 Multiple Program Participation among SSI Beneﬁciaries
A large fraction of SSI beneﬁciaries participate in other government
programs. Table 2.6 shows simultaneous program participation for SSI re-
cipients and their households by gender and age in 1999.43 In 1999, 36.1
Table 2.6 Prevalence of Multiple Program Participation by SSI Recipients, 1999, by Gender
and Age Group (%)
Male Female
Simultaneous Program 
Participanta,b 0–17 18–64 65+ 0–17 18–64 65+ All
SSI recipients
OASDI 7.3 31.8 55.9 7.2 29.1 60.4 37.6
Medicaid 79.6 89.9 91.9 78.4 90.8 92.3 89.4
Medicare c 32.2 77.7 c 27.8 88.0 41.4
General assistance c 0.5 0.8 c 2.3 0.4 1.0
WIC ccc c 4.4 c 1.4
School meals 78.6 0.8 c 75.9 0.5 c 10.8
TANF c 1.9 0.5 1.2 11.8 1.0 4.5
Unemployment insurance ccc ccc c
SSI households
Energy assistance 11.7 10.9 9.4 7.3 13.6 10.3 11.4
Housing assistance 9.8 6.6 6.6 11.9 12.4 8.6 9.4
Food stamps 37.0 39.3 31.2 36.2 50.9 42.5 42.6
Source: SSA, SSI Annual Statistical Report (2002b).
aBased on data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation.
bBased on SSA administrative records.
cLess than 0.5 percent of SSI recipients in the gender/age group participate in the program.
43. Unless otherwise noted, the percentages reported in table 2.6 are based on estimates
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation and taken from the SSI Annual Sta-
tistical Report (SSA 2002b).percent of all SSI recipients also received OASDI, either for retirement or
disability. Receipt of OASDI was most common among men and women
aged sixty-ﬁve and older. Medicaid receipt was nearly universal, with 89.4
percent of all SSI recipients on the program. A substantial fraction of SSI
recipients also received Medicare beneﬁts—41.4 percent in 1999. Looking
at other means-tested programs, 42.6 percent of households with an SSI re-
cipient also received food stamps, and about one in ten received energy or
housing assistance.
Separate data from the 1998 Green Book produced by the U.S. House of
Representatives (not shown) indicate that over time the percentage of SSI
recipients receiving OASDI and Medicare has been declining. At the same
time the percentage of SSI recipients receiving food stamps, assistance
from the special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants,
and Children (WIC), free or subsidized meals, and public housing has been
rising. The fact that a growing share of SSI recipients receive beneﬁts from
multiple means-tested programs suggests that the work incentives faced
by the typical beneﬁciary are increasingly complex. SSI beneﬁciaries face
multiple implicit taxes in the form of reduced beneﬁts from SSI and any
other transfer programs, plus the regular assortment of federal, state, and
local taxes, as well as the loss of medical insurance for those not meeting
the 1619(b) provisions. As others have shown, the cumulative marginal tax
rates for individuals receiving multiple programs can be quite high (Gi-
annarelli and Steuerle 1995; Keane and Moﬃtt 1998).
Although the empirical literature on the eﬀects of changes in these vari-
ous marginal tax rates will be discussed later in this chapter, it is useful to
lay out the tax circumstances SSI recipients potentially face. Figure 2.5
(from Burkhauser and Wittenburg 1996) shows how a single male’s 1994
net income changes with each additional dollar of his labor if he is eligible
to receive the federal SSI beneﬁt of $458 and the average cash value of
Medicaid insurance for SSI disability of $540 per month. With no labor
earnings, this person would receive $998 per month in SSI beneﬁts and
Medicaid insurance.
As the ﬁgure shows, the interaction of the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) and federal taxes as well as food stamps, which one-half of all SSI
beneﬁciaries receive, signiﬁcantly alters the marginal tax rates faced by re-
cipients with various amounts of labor earnings. The EITC phase-in sub-
sidy to work oﬀsets Social Security (FICA) taxes, but because the Food
Stamp Program subtracts 24 cents in food stamps for every dollar of labor
earnings, the net tax on the ﬁrst dollar of labor earnings is 23.85 percent.
This tax rate continues to the SSI disregard level of $85 per month. At this
point the 50-cent loss in SSI beneﬁts per dollar of labor earnings interacts
with the food stamp program taxes on work, resulting in a net tax of 58.85
percent. When the EITC plateau begins, the net tax on labor earnings rises
to 66.5 percent, and when the EITC phaseout tax begins, the net tax on la-
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deduction level is passed and federal income tax starts, the marginal tax
rate rises to 89.15 percent. Marginal tax rates only begin to fall after food
stamps and EITC break-even points are reached. The ﬁnal increase in tax
rates occurs just before SSI beneﬁts phase out, when all Medicaid beneﬁts
are lost because earned income now equals the Medicaid special eligibility
plateau. The reduction of such cumulatively high marginal tax rates via a
single universal income support program was one of the arguments made
in support of President Nixon’s original FAP program.
2.4 Review of Economic Issues
Although economic analysis of social programs frequently takes the
goals of the program as given, with SSI the motivation for the program is
itself an important determinant of how we view the behavioral reactions to
it. In this section we ﬁrst discuss the economic rationale behind a federal
income ﬂoor for the subset of the poor who are aged, blind, or disabled.
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Fig. 2.5 Marginal tax rates on labor earnings and net income for a single person
receiving Medicaid, SSI, and food stamps in 1994
Source: Burkhauser and Wittenburg (1996).Next, we review the theory related to individual responses to the existence
and structure of SSI including take-up, work, savings, and disability-
reporting behavior. Finally, we consider the equity goals of SSI and discuss
attempts to evaluate program eﬀectiveness.
2.4.1 Public Income Provision for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled
As noted earlier, SSI was born out of a failed eﬀort to provide a guaran-
teed income ﬂoor under all Americans—FAP. Hence, although the moti-
vation for providing an income ﬂoor to the subset of the adult poor who are
aged, blind, or disabled is primarily distributional, it also rests on a politi-
cal compromise that oﬀered this entitlement only to categories of individ-
uals not expected to work. Although this compromise allowed SSI to be-
come law in 1972, social expectations regarding work have changed over
time for the three groups targeted by SSI—the aged, blind, and disabled.
Individuals are living and working longer; the normal retirement age for
Social Security beneﬁts has been raised; and the ADA has granted people
with disabilities a legal right to equal access to employment.
Although work expectations have risen for the aged, it is people with dis-
abilities who have experienced the largest shift in public attitudes. In 1990,
people with disabilities successfully argued that unequal access to jobs—
rather than an impairment—is the primary barrier to employment oppor-
tunities. As a result, people with disabilities gained legal rights to accom-
modation under Title I of the ADA. Some disability advocates even have
argued that there is no such thing as a disabled worker; rather, there is only
a society that does not provide the appropriate accommodations for such
individuals.44 In a world of full accommodation, the disability-transfer
population should be zero. Such attitudinal changes raise basic questions
about how society should treat people with disabilities. Most fundamental
of these questions is whether people with disabilities should categorically
be expected to work or not.
These types of cultural changes potentially shift the boundaries of the
population that is not expected to work and hence is eligible for a categor-
ical guaranteed income ﬂoor based on age or disability. As the opportuni-
ties for employment and the demand for the productivity of people with
disabilities and those over age sixty-ﬁve increase, the clear categorical lines
drawn between them and other groups with similar diﬃculties ﬁnding
work, such as low-skilled or less-educated younger persons, or single
mothers facing welfare limits, are increasingly blurred.
The original political compromise that made the families of disabled
children eligible for SSI was slightly diﬀerent and represented a departure
from the not-expected-to-work criterion applied to the aged and to adults
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44. See Johnson (1997) for alternative views of the rights and responsibilities of people with
disabilities.with disabilities. Some argued that SSI beneﬁts for disabled children re-
placed the earnings of parents forced to reduce their work eﬀort in order
to care for their newly disabled child. Others argued that SSI-children ben-
eﬁts indirectly oﬀset extra disability-related household expenses. In both
cases, SSI-children beneﬁts were intended to oﬀset lost income and par-
tially return the family to its previous level of economic well-being. (See
NASI 1995 for a fuller discussion of these issues.)
2.4.2 SSI and Behavioral Change
If the aged and disabled adults are neither able nor expected to work,
then many of the disincentives discussed in regard to other means-tested
transfer programs are irrelevant. In such a world, cumulative marginal tax
rates could approach 100 percent with no change in work behavior, and
SSI could provide relatively high income guarantees and still maintain
relatively low break-even points (the income level at which a person is no
longer eligible for beneﬁts). Moreover, to the degree that age and work dis-
ability are clearly deﬁned and immutable categories, diﬀerences in the
guarantees, time limits, or funding mechanisms for SSI and other pro-
grams would have little eﬀect on SSI allowances and caseloads. In such a
world SSI program participation is purely a function of the prevalence of
health limitations in the low-income population. We will suggest that none
of these premises hold with respect to the disability component of SSI.
Thus, SSI policymakers must take behavioral changes on the part of po-
tential SSI recipients and state and local governments into account when
establishing program eligibility criteria and considering future program
rules.
Propensity to Apply for SSI
Disability is neither a static nor a precise concept. Responses to the on-
set of health conditions depend not only on the severity of the impairment,
but also on the social environment that people with health impairments
face—including the availability of employment; the availability of accom-
modation, rehabilitation, and retraining; the presence of legal supports or
protections; and the accessibility and generosity of SSI and other govern-
ment transfer programs. The propensity for individuals to apply for SSI
beneﬁts depends on the probability they place on their health impairment
and vocational circumstances being suﬃcient to meet the SSI disability el-
igibility standards as well as on their employment potential and the gen-
erosity of SSI relative to other forms of public assistance. The latter com-
parison is particularly relevant in light of 1996 welfare reform (PRWORA)
that restricts the access to, and generosity of, alternative public assistance
programs. If low-income adults have health conditions or have children
with health conditions, the generosity of SSI relative to other alternatives
may induce individuals to apply for beneﬁts.
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The economics of program participation and labor supply for individu-
als potentially eligible for SSI mirrors the analyses of these issues in pro-
grams such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Thus, to understand
the work disincentives embodied in the SSI program, we turn to the frame-
work used for other categorical welfare programs. Moﬃtt (1986) provides
a discussion of the basic economic issues. In these models individuals make
choices that depend on the income gained from the program and the costs
of participating, including the time and money costs associated with ap-
plying for and maintaining eligibility for beneﬁts.
To see how this works in the case of SSI, consider the conventional la-
bor-leisure model diagramed in ﬁgure 2.6.45 Figure 2.6 compares the bud-
get constraint of an SSI program with a 50 percent marginal tax rate (t  
0.5) to one with a marginal tax rate of 100 percent (t   1.0). Segment
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45. This discussion draws from the expositions in Moﬃtt (1986), Hoynes and Moﬃtt
(1996), and Moﬃtt’s review of the AFDC/TANF program (chap. 5) in this volume. This dis-
cussion is made primarily in the context of adults with disabilities.
Fig. 2.6 Budget constraints with diﬀerent marginal tax rates (BC: marginal tax
rate   100 percent; BD: marginal tax rate   50 percent)
Source: Hoynes and Moﬃtt (1996).ACDE of the ﬁgure represents the budget constraint of those not categor-
ically eligible for SSI. The line has a slope equal to the hourly wage rate, w.
Segment ABCDE applies to the same individuals if they are categorically
eligible and if they face a marginal tax rate of 100 percent. Beneﬁts are
taxed one dollar for each dollar earned and phased out at the break-even
level (point C). That is, even though they are categorically eligible for ben-
eﬁts, their labor earnings oﬀset all SSI beneﬁts at hour levels greater than
point C. Segment ABDE applies to the same people, but now they face a
marginal tax rate of 50 percent. Beneﬁts are taxed at a rate of 50 cents per
dollar earned, and the break-even hours point is D. Under this model, cat-
egorical eligibility for SSI beneﬁts unambiguously reduces work eﬀort rel-
ative to not being categorically eligible. There is an income eﬀect associ-
ated with the guarantee (AB) and a substitution eﬀect associated with the
marginal tax rate (BC or BD). The income and substitution eﬀects work in
the same direction, and hours of work among participants fall. Only those
whose optimal hours worked prior to program eligibility were beyond the
break-even hours point may not be aﬀected, and even then it will depend
on the shape of their indiﬀerence curve (i.e., some would be willing to ac-
cept less income by substantially reducing work and living on program
beneﬁts).
The next question to ask is what happens if the marginal tax rate is re-
duced. Here the answer is unclear; the net eﬀect of a reduction in t, from
100 percent (BC) to 50 percent (BD), is ambiguous. The arrows in ﬁgure
2.6 show the various responses that could occur following a reduction in
the marginal tax rate (represented by a shift from segment BC to BD). For
individuals initially receiving SSI beneﬁts and not working (i.e., initially at
point B), a reduction in the tax rate may encourage participants to work
more, which is represented by arrow 1. At the same time, a reduction in t
expands the range of individuals eligible for beneﬁts and brings some por-
tion of those categorically eligible but not previously receiving SSI onto the
rolls. As these individuals move onto SSI their work eﬀort is reduced, as
shown by arrow 2. Arrow 3 shows that some categorically eligible individ-
uals who continue to earn too much under the lower tax rate may be moti-
vated to reduce their hours of work enough to become eligible for beneﬁts,
thereby combining work and SSI beneﬁts. Finally, it is also possible that a
reduction in t will increase payments by enough to induce previously eligi-
ble persons on earnings grounds but not on categorical grounds (segment
AC) to risk entry onto the rolls.
Taking each of these possibilities into account, the net eﬀect of a lower
marginal tax rate on work eﬀort is ambiguous. The only thing that is clear
is that lower marginal tax rates increase caseloads. A lower tax rate makes
more categorically eligible individuals eligible for the program on income
grounds and, given positive takeup rates, unambiguously boosts the num-
ber of individuals on the rolls. Moreover, by lowering the costs associated
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program, thereby increasing caseloads. Finally, lower marginal tax rates
may induce those on the margin of categorical eligibility on health grounds
to apply for beneﬁts, since the gains to program acceptance have increased.
Unlike SSI beneﬁts for the elderly, where categorical age eligibility is eas-
ily demonstrated and beneﬁt receipt is automatic if one meets the means
test, categorical eligibility for SSI beneﬁts is more diﬃcult to demonstrate.
Thus, eligibility for beneﬁts is not certain, and models of SSI application
must take this risk of nonacceptance into consideration. In general, those
considering applying for SSI will value disability beneﬁts with a probability
of less than one. Holding the underlying health condition constant, the
probability of acceptance onto the rolls will depend on the disability screen-
ing process. Conditional on the same impairment, tighter eligibility criteria
are likely to increase the probability of denial and reduce the expected value
of applying. In contrast, looser criteria increase the probability of accept-
ance and increase the expected value of applying.46In either case, individu-
als facing uncertainty surrounding acceptance, informational hurdles, or
stigma associated with beneﬁt receipt may be induced to participate by the
increase in beneﬁts associated with the lower marginal tax rate.
If those categorically eligible for beneﬁts on health grounds are com-
pletely unable to perform any substantial gainful activity under any cir-
cumstances, then there is no need to lower the marginal tax rate on SSI,
since those on the program are neither expected nor able to work. However,
to the extent that work is both possible and expected for people with dis-
abilities who meet the other eligibility criteria, policy discussions with re-
spect to trade-oﬀs between tax rates, guarantees, and break-even points
become much closer to those taking place for other income maintenance
programs.
The same model also incorporates stigma and other ﬁxed program costs.
As in other income maintenance programs, the presence of stigma and
other program costs associated with applying for beneﬁts explains why
some categorically eligible individuals are observed on segment ACD. As
ﬁxed program costs and stigma decline, participation among this group
will rise. What the model in ﬁgure 2.6 does not show are potential program
interaction eﬀects. As discussed in ﬁgure 2.5, the actual budget constraint
facing those categorically eligible for SSI beneﬁts is more complex, with
more nonlinearities due to the cumulation of taxes from multiple pro-
grams. In a like manner, multiple program eligibility will cause complica-
tions for those interested in the behavioral eﬀects of other transfer pro-
grams. Burkhauser and Smeeding (1981) and Powers and Neumark (2001)
show that the incentives to accept actuarially reduced Social Security ben-
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46. Weathers (1999) develops a multiperiod model of the SSDI application process in which
the optimal time of application following the onset of a disability is a function of the oppor-
tunity cost of lost wages versus the gain in SSDI, adjusted for the probability of acceptance.
A similar model could be used to predict the timing of SSI disability applications.eﬁts (OASI) at younger retirement ages are increased for those who would
be eligible for both SSI and OASI at age sixty-ﬁve, since OASI beneﬁts af-
ter a small disregard are taxed on a dollar-for-dollar basis by SSI.
Finally, one can also use the model in ﬁgure 2.6 to think about the labor-
supply behavior of parents of children with disabilities. If a child is judged
eligible for SSI beneﬁts, then an able-bodied parent faces the same mar-
ginal tax rates, guarantees, and break-even points shown in ﬁgure 2.6.
Stigma, information costs, and reduced program beneﬁts (adjusted for the
probability of acceptance) also apply. One additional issue that aﬀects par-
ents of children with disabilities is how beneﬁt receipt will inﬂuence the fu-
ture well-being of their child.
Saving Behavior
The presence of asset testing in the eligibility criteria for SSI may reduce
saving among those meeting other eligibility criteria. This point is made
generally about means-tested programs. Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes
(1995) argue that when eligibility is tied to assets, individuals meeting the
income test have incentives to reduce their savings in order to qualify for
beneﬁts. Among those applying for SSI beneﬁts, the most likely group to
be aﬀected by the asset test is the elderly, who may have accumulated sav-
ings over their lifetime.
2.4.3 Balancing Eﬃciency and Equity Concerns
Our discussion above has focused on the behavioral eﬀects of the SSI
program. This focus on the eﬃciency costs of SSI-induced behavioral
change ignores the social beneﬁts of SSI and may lead some to conclude
that a socially optimal SSI program would have no behavioral impact on
beneﬁt applications, work, or saving. This conclusion is inappropriate for
two reasons. First, even if actual disability status were perfectly observable,
society would probably still want to target some level of beneﬁts on disad-
vantaged low-income workers and their families even if it resulted in some
eﬃciency losses. Hence, the more important question is not whether there
are program-related behavioral changes but whether they are small relative
to the social gains from redistributing income to less advantaged persons.
Analyses of the welfare implications of the SSI program should focus on
this second and more important question.
Second, in a world where the socially appropriate eligibility standard for
SSI is diﬃcult to assess, some individuals will be denied beneﬁts who are
less capable of work than is socially acceptable. In such a world, a more le-
nient eligibility criterion will involve a trade-oﬀ between the reduction of
type II errors on the one hand and the additional costs of type I errors on
the other. The issue is this: In the presence of uncertainty, do the social
beneﬁts outweigh the eﬃciency costs arising from increasing the probabil-
ity of guaranteeing an income ﬂoor to those below some minimum level of
work capacity at the cost of also providing these funds to some who are
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to SSI as a mechanism for providing social protection against the economic
consequences of aging and disability for disadvantaged workers. To do
otherwise would be to hold too narrow a view from a social policy per-
spective. See Bound et al. 2002 for a fuller discussion of these issues.
2.5 Review of the Evidence
In the previous section we reviewed the potential consequences on ap-
plication, work, and saving behavior of SSI program rules and showed that
if the aged or disabled adults are capable of work, the SSI program rules
could inﬂuence their behavior. We also discussed how SSI program rules
could aﬀect the work behavior of the parents of children with disabilities.
In this section we review the empirical literature on the eﬀects of the exis-
tence and structure of SSI on behavior. Despite the size and importance of
the SSI program, the empirical literature on its behavioral eﬀects is rela-
tively small. Moreover, almost without exception, empirical studies focus
on only one of the three groups SSI targets. For this reason, the empirical
evidence on the behavioral eﬀects of SSI for each target population group
will be discussed in turn.
2.5.1 SSI and Adults with Disabilities
Work Eﬀort of Adults with Disabilities47
Most of the research on the work eﬀort of those with disabilities focuses
on a broader population than those receiving either SSI or SSDI. The most
common analyses rely on nationally representative survey data that in-
clude questions about whether a health limitation prevents individuals
from working or limits their ability to work full time or to do certain jobs.48
Although such research is not as targeted as one might like, it does provide
a backdrop for understanding the types of trends faced by the SSI pro-
gram.
Based on these data, ﬁgure 2.7 shows that over the past two decades em-
ployment rates for those with disabilities as well as SSDI and SSI caseloads
have varied greatly, ﬂuctuating with the economy, changes in beneﬁt eligi-
bility criteria, and the implementation of other public policies intended to
support people with disabilities. The ﬁgure shows employment rates of
working-age men and women with self-reported disabilities and the num-
ber of individuals receiving disability beneﬁts for the period 1980–99. The
employment data come from Burkhauser et al. (2002) and reﬂect the em-
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47. This discussion draws from Burkhauser and Daly (2002).
48. Although numerous scholars have questioned the validity of such data, Burkhauser et
al. (2002) show that questions of this type can be used to track trends in outcomes, such as
employment, for the population with disabilities.The Supplemental Security Income Program 115
Fig. 2.7 Disability beneﬁt rolls and employment rates among working-age men
and women with disabilities
ployment rates of Current Population Survey (CPS) respondents who say
they are limited in the amount or type of work they can perform. Data on
SSDI and SSI beneﬁciaries come from the SSA (2002a). Also indicated in
the ﬁgure are a few key events: the liberalization of disability screening in
1984 and the passage of the ADA in 1990.
The trends in ﬁgure 2.7 highlight the major concerns of disability poli-
cymakers over the past two decades. First, the number of disability beneﬁ-
ciaries has increased continuously since the eligibility expansion and liber-
alization in 1984, with especially strong growth during the 1990s
(application and acceptance rates in the 1990s rivaled those experienced
during the expansion period of the late 1970s). Second, whereas employ-
ment rates for those with self-reported work limitations rose through the
economic expansion of the late 1980s, they have fallen almost continuously
since, even during the strong expansion of the 1990s.
So far, three major hypotheses have been proposed to explain this de-
cline. Kaye (forthcoming) argues that declining employment rates among
those with disabilities in the 1990s were caused by dramatic increases in the
severity of impairments. Hence, for Kaye, the recent trends are health-
based and not a reﬂection of changes in public policy. Other researchershave taken a more social environment–oriented view. For example,
DeLeire (2000) and Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) attribute the downturn
in employment among those with disabilities during the 1990s to the pas-
sage of the ADA. Bound and Waidmann (2002) argue that changes in dis-
ability beneﬁts eligibility and generosity made it easier and more proﬁtable
for workers to leave the labor force and take beneﬁts. Autor and Duggan
(2001) suggest that a combination of disability beneﬁts that replaced a
greater share of labor earnings and declining job opportunities for low-
skilled workers induced an increasing share of workers to choose beneﬁts
over employment. Which one of the many changing social variables de-
serves the most credit is a matter for future research, but in all likelihood
the true cause is a combination of factors, rather than a single policy action
or identiﬁable event.
While researchers debate the reasons for the declining employment and
rising beneﬁt rates of men and women with disabilities during the 1990s,
policymakers are debating whether these outcomes are signs of success or
failure of U.S. disability policy. For some advocates of those with disabili-
ties, the increasing disability beneﬁt rolls reﬂect an appropriate increase in
support for a group of workers with limited labor market opportunities.
For others, the increased rolls reﬂect the shortcomings of a transfer-
focused policy that failed to provide the necessary supports (e.g., universal
health insurance, rehabilitation, and job services) to allow individuals to
select work over beneﬁts. For others still, the outcomes observed during
the 1990s are simply evidence of the law of unintended consequences in
policy making, whereby policies to promote economic well-being (in the
case of beneﬁts) and work (in the case of the ADA) actually increased the
disability beneﬁt rolls and reduced employment.
Whichever explanation accounts for the decline in employment among
those with disabilities, research by Bound, Burkhauser, and Nichols (forth-
coming) shows that one must be careful in making general statements
about the population targeted by SSI based on aggregate data on the pop-
ulation with disabilities or data on the SSDI targeted population. Table
2.7, taken from Bound, Burkhauser, and Nichols, uses longitudinal data
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) linked to So-
cial Security administrative ﬁles to compare the monthly labor earnings
and employment of those who apply for SSI or SSDI three years before ap-
plication, one to three months before application, and three years after ap-
plication. As table 2.7 shows, unlike SSDI applicants, the vast majority of
SSI applicants are not employed three years before they apply for beneﬁts.
Only 25 (28) percent of those awarded (denied) SSI were working three
years before their application, and their average monthly labor earnings
were only $144 ($260). Moreover, both their employment and their average
monthly labor earnings were a small fraction of the employment and labor
earnings of SSDI applicants three years prior to application.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.The data in table 2.7 suggest that the factors causing the low employ-
ment and labor earnings of SSI applicants at the time of application and
after they move onto the SSI rolls were in eﬀect well before the time of their
application. This is not surprising, since Bound, Burkhauser, and Nichols
also show that the typical SSI applicant is less likely than the typical SSDI
applicant to be white, a high school graduate, married, wealthy, or living in
a high-income household prior to application.
Factors Aﬀecting SSI Participation
Although application for SSI disability beneﬁts is a function of health,
it is also inﬂuenced by program rules and beneﬁts. These include eligibility
criteria and the generosity of beneﬁts relative to work, the comparative
generosity and availability of other means-tested welfare and social insur-
ance programs, macroeconomic conditions (national, state, and local),
and applicants’ education and job skills. During the 1990s, considerable at-
tention was devoted to understanding the link between these nonhealth
factors and SSI caseload growth. The following discussion reviews the ev-
idence on determinants of SSI caseload growth, looking ﬁrst at the rela-
tionship between caseload dynamics and screening stringency (beneﬁt
supply) and then at factors aﬀecting the demand for SSI beneﬁts, includ-
ing ease of beneﬁt access, beneﬁt generosity relative to work and other pro-
grams, and economic conditions.
The SSA began modifying its disability determination process in the
mid-1970s. Concerned that state oﬃces were not consistently and uni-
formly applying the residual functional capacity (RFC) and vocational
standards in adult disability determinations, in 1979 SSA published regu-
lations specifying who was to be classiﬁed as disabled, essentially tighten-
ing the eligibility criteria. The SSA also tightened its policy towards bene-
ﬁt terminations in continuing disability reviews (CDRs) by state Disability
Determination Services (DDS), permitting beneﬁt termination without
proof of medical improvement. This policy resulted in a threefold increase
in the number of cessation decisions on continuing reviews by state agen-
cies (Lewin-VHI 1999). Consistent with the tighter standards, the yearly
allowance rate (initial acceptances divided by initial applications) of adult
SSI disability applications began to fall in 1976 (table 2.8).
The Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980 continued the trend
of tightening the disability determination and review process. Importantly,
the 1980 law changed both the frequency and nature of medical eligibility
reviews done on disability beneﬁciaries.49 Before 1980, the only beneﬁciar-
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49. The 1980 law tightened SSA control over the state disability determination services. In
particular, the SSA had previously reserved the right to review initial determinations before
they were transmitted to the applicant, but during the 1970s it reviewed only 5 percent. The
1980 amendments required that SSA review two-thirds of successful applications. To enforce
administrative control over administrative law judges, the secretary of Health and Humanies targeted for medical eligibility review were those who had conditions
that were likely to improve over time. The new law stipulated that all bene-
ﬁciaries should periodically receive continuing disability reviews and that
all but those deemed to have permanent disabilities should be reviewed
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Table 2.8 SSI Allowance Rates and Annual Changes in Beneﬁciaries,
Adults 18–64, 1974–2001
Allowance Number of Beneﬁciaries Yearly % Change
Rate (%) (thousands) in Beneﬁciaries
1974 47.8 1,503
1975 52.6 1,699 13.0
1976 47.1 1,714 0.9
1977 42.2 1,737 1.3
1978 36.4 1,747 0.6
1979 31.5 1,727 –1.1
1980 29.5 1,731 0.2
1981 29.5 1,703 –1.6
1982 26.6 1,655 –2.8
1983 32.2 1,700 2.7
1984 38.2 1,780 4.7
1985 32.0 1,879 5.6
1986 36.8 2,010 6.7
1987 36.2 2,119 5.4
1988 37.1 2,203 4.0
1989 39.5 2,302 4.5
1990 40.5 2,450 6.4
1991 39.4 2,642 7.8
1992 44.5 2,910 10.1
1993 41.1 3,148 8.2
1994 39.4 3,335 5.9
1995 42.5 3,482 4.4
1996 41.6 3,569 2.5
1997 40.8 3,562 –0.2
1998 42.9 3,646 2.4
1999 43.0 3,690 1.2
2000 39.4 3,744 1.5
2001 38.0 3,811 1.8
Source: Authors’ calculations from SSA data, SSI Annual Statistical Report 2001 (2002b).
Note: Allowance rates equal initial awards divided by initial applications.
Services was empowered to appeal administrative law judge rulings that were favorable to the
applicant.
Prior to 1980, the law provided that disability determinations be performed by state agen-
cies under an agreement negotiated by the states and the secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices. The 1980 amendments required that disability determinations be made by state agen-
cies according to regulations of the secretary. It also required the secretary to issue regulations
specifying performance standards to be followed in the disability determinations, and if the
secretary found that a state agency was failing to make disability determinations consistent
with regulations, then the secretary was required to terminate the state’s authority and assume
federal responsibility for the determinations.every three years. The 1980 law made permanent the practice of using the
same standards in CDRs that were applied when initially evaluating
claimants. In addition to tightening the disability adjudication and review
process, the 1980 law established two key work incentives: (a) the 1619(b)
provision, and (b) the deduction of impairment-related work expenses (IR-
WEs) from earnings when determining the SGA. As noted earlier, the
1619(b) provision authorized a three-year demonstration project, allowing
for the payment of special SSI beneﬁts (and the retention of Medicaid cov-
erage) for SSI recipients who exceeded the SGA level. Section 1619 became
permanent in 1986.
As could be expected, the 1980 law had a discernible impact on admin-
istrative practice. As demonstrated in table 2.8, the yearly allowance rate
for adult SSI disability recipients fell from a high of 52.6 percent in 1975 to
26.6 percent in 1982. The number of recipients fell from 1.75 million in
1978 to 1.66 million in 1982. This decrease occurred despite the economic
recession of 1980–82. This removal of individuals from the rolls generated
a major political response. Most of the people removed from the rolls ap-
pealed the decision, requesting a hearing before an administrative law
judge and causing a huge backlog of cases. As a result, some state gover-
nors instructed their DDS service not to terminate anyone from the dis-
ability rolls unless that person’s conditions had improved.50
In 1984, in response to concerns that federal disability policy had be-
come too restrictive, the SSA agreed to a moratorium on CDRs pending
the enactment and implementation of revised guidelines. The 1984 law had
profound eﬀects on the standards used to evaluate a person’s potential eli-
gibility for SSI. When reviewing existing beneﬁciaries, the burden of proof
was shifted back to the SSA to show that a beneﬁciary’s health had im-
proved suﬃciently to allow him or her to return to work. A moratorium
was imposed on re-evaluations of the most troublesome cases—those that
involved mental impairments or pain—until more appropriate guidelines
could be developed. Finally, beneﬁts were continued pending the outcome
of an appeal.
The 1984 law substantially increased the weight given to source evidence
(i.e., evidence provided by the claimant’s own physician) by requiring that
it be considered ﬁrst, prior to the results of an SSA consultative examina-
tion. The SSA was also required to consider the combined eﬀect of all im-
pairments, whether or not any one impairment was severe enough to qual-
ify a person for beneﬁts. Perhaps most important, the SSA substantially
revised its treatment of mental illness, reducing the weight given to diag-
nostic or medical factors, and emphasizing the ability of an individual to
function in work or worklike settings.
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50. For a fuller discussion of disability policy in this period, see Berkowitz and Burkhauser
(1996).Table 2.8 shows that the dip in the SSI adult disability population that
occurred between 1978 and 1982 was reversed thereafter and rose about 4
or 5 percent a year during the economic growth years of the later 1980s.
When the next economic downturn came in the early 1990s, conditions
were ripe for a surge in applications and in the number of people on the SSI
disability rolls. The increases in the disability transfer population in the
early 1990s exceeded anything seen in SSI since the start of the program.
The annual acceptance rate for SSI adult disability beneﬁts was almost 45
percent in 1992, the highest since 1976. Economic recovery and Congres-
sional action with respect to SSI disability eligibility in 1996 have slowed
the growth in the working-age adult SSI population, and acceptance rates
in 2000 and 2001 were back to the levels of the late 1980s. However, the eco-
nomic downturn could result in an increase in the rolls.51
The legislative history underlying the disability screening process high-
lights how access to beneﬁts has changed over time. Figure 2.8 shows that
the desire for SSI disability beneﬁts has also ﬂuctuated. Fluctuations in ap-
plications have been as large as changes in the SSI disability rolls. To some
extent these ﬂuctuations have mirrored changes in eligibility standards,
contracting when eligibility standards were tightened in the late 1970s and
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51. As part of more general welfare reforms in 1996, Congress removed drug and alcohol
addiction as allowable conditions for SSI eligibility. In 1995, there were about 135,000 SSI re-
cipients whose disability was based solely on drug addiction or alcoholism. The Congres-
sional Budget Oﬃce estimated that about 65 percent of these individuals would be eligible for
SSI based on other suﬃciently disabling conditions. For a full discussion of these reforms and
their impact see U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means (1998).
Fig. 2.8 Applications and awards among population 18–64 (per 1,000 in popula-
tion)
Source: SSA (various years).early 1980s, rising after the relaxation of eligibility standards in 1984, and
falling again following the tightening of standards in the mid-1990s. How-
ever, other factors, including local economic conditions, outreach eﬀorts
by both SSA and state governments to search for eligible candidates, and
the generosity of SSI relative to other programs, are all likely to have con-
tributed to the variability in applications over time.
A number of scholars have estimated the link between local economic
conditions and SSI application rates. The fact that SSI is a national pro-
gram restricts the extent to which regional variation in beneﬁts can be used
to identify the eﬀect of the program on applications. However, Black,
Daniel, and Sanders (2002) used regional variation in economic conditions
to identify the eﬀect of ﬁnancial incentives on the decision to apply for SSI
(and SSDI) disability beneﬁts. In particular, they examined the impacts of
the coal boom during the 1970s and the coal bust during the 1980s on the
number of SSI beneﬁciaries. Using panel data on 186 counties in Kentucky,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia, they estimated an elasticity of pro-
gram payments with respect to local area earnings of between –0.5 and 
–0.7 for SSI recipients. Although these results lend some support to the no-
tion that labor market conditions in an area aﬀect the decision of individ-
uals to apply for disability beneﬁts, the point estimates are hard to inter-
pret. Black, Daniel, and Sanders interpret the estimated coeﬃcient on the
local earnings variable as reﬂecting the eﬀect of changes in the ﬁnancial at-
tractiveness of disability beneﬁts. However, given the nature of the speciﬁ-
cation used, it is possible that the earnings variable is picking up the eﬀect
of general economic conditions rather than the relative ﬁnancial attrac-
tiveness of SSI.52 Furthermore, their estimates reﬂect the short-run eﬀect
of changes in the local economies in Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
West Virginia on the number of disability beneﬁciaries. Given the fact that
the typical SSI spell is lengthy in duration, long-run eﬀects likely will be
substantially larger than short-run eﬀects.
A considerable amount of government-sponsored research has at-
tempted to explain the dramatic growth in the SSI population in the early
1990s. A useful summary of this work can be found in Rupp and Stapleton
(1995). Much of this analysis has used the considerable variation in state-
level applications and awards to test the models. Using cross-state data
from 1988–92, Stapleton et al. (1998) ﬁnd convincing evidence that the re-
cession of the early 1990s contributed to the rapid rise in the number of ap-
plications for SSI beneﬁts. They estimate that a 1 percentage point rise in
the unemployment rate was associated with a 2 percent rise in applications
for SSI. The eﬀects on ﬁnal awards were somewhat lower. Finally, they
found that the changes in the unemployment rate had a smaller eﬀect on
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52. As will be discussed shortly, the evidence that recessions lead to increases in the num-
ber of applications for SSI is strong.beneﬁt awards than on applications, suggesting that recessions induce
those with less severe disabilities to apply for SSDI and SSI beneﬁts.
Stapleton et al. (1998) also provide strong, if indirect, evidence that
changes in screening stringency in the 1990s played a central role in ex-
plaining program growth. Indeed, the very fact that award rates were rising
at the same time that application rates were rising would seem to suggest
an important role for changes in screening stringency. They ﬁnd that
changes in the unemployment rate, together with other factors they include
in their models, could explain almost all of the growth in applications for
impairments related to conditions of internal organs, but could account
for much less of the growth in applications for impairments related to mus-
culoskeletal or mental health conditions. These patterns suggest that regu-
latory changes such as the increased weight given to pain and other symp-
toms, the increased reliance on source evidence, and the broadening of the
standards used for those with mental impairments have contributed im-
portantly to the recent surge in applications for SSI.
Whereas the 1990s recession seems to be part of the explanation for the
rapid rise in applications for SSI beneﬁts that occurred during the ﬁrst part
of the 1990s, no such rise occurred during the severe recession of the early
1980s. A reasonable interpretation of these patterns is that the tightening
of eligibility standards that occurred during the early 1980s counteracted
the eﬀects of the 1980s recession. During the mid-1980s, when eligibility
standards were relaxed again, the booming economy slowed any immedi-
ate response. However, when the 1990s recession hit, applications grew
rapidly.
Researchers studying the increases in SSI caseloads have found evidence
that an important factor explaining the growth in SSI over the 1990s has
been eﬀorts by states to shift individuals oﬀstate-funded programs such as
general assistance and onto SSI. States that cut general assistance beneﬁts
experienced above-average growth in the application for SSI beneﬁts
(Lewin-VHI 1995). Using monthly administrative data from Michigan,
Bound, Kossoudji, and Ricart-Moes (1998) ﬁnd that the increase in the ap-
plication for SSI beneﬁts exactly coincided with the end of general assis-
tance in Michigan. However, they also ﬁnd that general assistance beneﬁts
are typically less generous than are SSI beneﬁts. This ﬁnding is surprising
within the context of a simple labor supply model that ignores the relative
costs of application for these two types of beneﬁts. The fact that many po-
tentially eligible people did not apply for the more generous SSI beneﬁts
suggests that applying for disability beneﬁts may be diﬃcult and onerous.
There is also considerable anecdotal evidence that states and third parties
often act as intermediaries to facilitate the SSI application process (Liver-
more, Stapleton, and Zeuschner 1998; Bound, Kossoudji, and Ricart-
Moes 1998).
Brown, Hoyt, and Scott (1999) approach a similar question using county-
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1996 welfare reform, variation in AFDC programs across states explains
little of the variation in SSI participation. They also ﬁnd that program and
eligibility variables explain more of the county-to-county variation in SSI
participation than in AFDC participation, suggesting that SSI is a more
tightly targeted program than AFDC. Still, they conclude that given the
signiﬁcant changes in welfare programs embodied in the transition from
AFDC to TANF, SSI participation rates likely will be aﬀected.
Increases in the value of Medicaid beneﬁts for individuals on SSI also
may have contributed to the recent growth in applications for both pro-
grams. Yelowitz (1998) uses cross-state variation in Medicaid beneﬁts to
estimate the eﬀect of changes in their value on participation in SSI. In par-
ticular, in response to court orders, many states increased Medicaid bene-
ﬁts in 1991. Using these changes, Yelowitz estimates that increases in the
value of Medicaid that occurred over the late 1980s and early 1990s can ex-
plain about 20 percent of the increase in the working-age population re-
ceiving SSI beneﬁts.
However suggestive Yelowitz’s results are, they do not seem to be very
robust. Stapleton and his colleagues (Lewin-VHI 1995) used Yelowitz’s
methodology to look at the eﬀect of changes in the value of Medicaid on
the application for SSI beneﬁts and found no measurable eﬀects. Given the
expectation that increases in the value of Medicaid would initially have a
proportionately bigger eﬀect on the number of applications (a ﬂow) than
on the beneﬁciaries (a stock), this nonresult is surprising. Although it is
hard to imagine that eligibility for Medicaid beneﬁts does not make SSI
more attractive, ﬁnding statistical evidence of this eﬀect has proven to be
quite challenging.
Eﬀects of Work Incentives and Disincentives
Because the United States has few program alternatives that oﬀer long-
term beneﬁts to working-age persons who are not working, the relatively
generous beneﬁts and imperfect screening mechanisms in SSI could pose
signiﬁcant work disincentives for persons with disabilities who are consid-
ering applying for beneﬁts. Additionally, the high marginal tax rates for
those on the program could discourage exit from it and entry into the labor
force.
A large empirical literature has tried to estimate the magnitude of moral
hazard eﬀects. Some of that literature has examined the net eﬀect of SSI
(and SSDI) on labor force participation rates, such as how much higher
participation rates would be were it not for these programs. However, this
literature has primarily focused on estimating the disincentive eﬀects of
SSDI program parameters, beneﬁt generosity, or screening stringency. For
a complete review of this literature see Bound and Burkhauser (1999). Al-
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into how the SSI program aﬀects the behavior of low-income adults with
disabilities, doing so is problematic. First, whereas both programs use the
same criteria of inability to perform substantial gainful activity with re-
spect to establishing categorical eligibility, the beneﬁt structures of the two
programs are quite diﬀerent.53 Second and perhaps more important, as
noted earlier, typical SSDI applicants have much diﬀerent socioeconomic
characteristics and work histories than typical SSI applicants.
As seen in table 2.7, most of the individuals who apply for SSI were not
working three years prior to application. More importantly, the causes for
their low employment rates at that time likely were more closely associated
with the problems faced by low-skilled or poorly educated workers gener-
ally than with speciﬁc eﬀects of poor health or of the work disincentives of
SSI or SSDI. Furthermore, only 19 percent of those who were denied SSI
beneﬁts were employed three years after their application (table 2.7). In
contrast, 35 percent of denied SSDI applicants were employed three years
after application. These patterns suggest that changes in program work in-
centives and disincentives for those on the SSI rolls are less likely to induce
them to leave the rolls and return to employment than would be the case
for SSDI beneﬁciaries. This seems especially likely given that far fewer SSI
beneﬁciaries than SSDI beneﬁciaries worked three years prior to applica-
tion when they presumably did not have a work limitation severe enough
to qualify for beneﬁts.
Although it is not clear that SSDI research will shed much light on the
work behavior of SSI recipients, there is a large literature on the work in-
centives and disincentives in other welfare programs. This empirical re-
search consistently ﬁnds that recipients are unresponsive to changes in
marginal tax rates (for reviews of this literature see Moﬃtt 1986 and
Hoynes and Moﬃtt 1996). This literature provides little evidence that in-
dividuals participating in means-tested programs respond to ﬁnancial in-
centives by working more. Research on the extent to which individuals
with disabilities have the same income and substitution elasticities of par-
ticipants in other programs would be an important step in determining
whether the results discussed are applicable to the SSI population.
Finally, the small amount of research that does exist on the work eﬀorts
of SSI recipients suggests that, despite special allowances for SSI recipi-
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53. For example, SSDI is an insurance-based (non-means-tested) program with its beneﬁts
based on past individual earnings history, whereas SSI is a ﬂat-rate means-tested welfare pro-
gram. SSDI provides recipients Medicare beneﬁts after they are on the program two years and
restricts its recipients to labor earnings up to $750 per month for a limited period, after which
they face a signiﬁcant program “notch” and lose all SSDI beneﬁts. The SSI program provides
its recipients with immediate access to Medicaid and, once on the program, allows them more
generous work options compared to SSDI.ents who receive earnings (e.g., 1619[a] and [b] status), only a small per-
centage of disabled adult SSI recipients work.54In 1976 only 3.4 percent of
all disabled adult beneﬁciaries worked. Since that time, the percentage of
disabled adult SSI recipients with earnings has nearly doubled, but, at 6.3
percent in 2001, it remains quite low.55A somewhat more optimistic picture
comes from work by Muller, Scott, and Bye (1996), who look at the work
history of SSI recipients. They ﬁnd that among a sample of SSI beneﬁciar-
ies coming onto the rolls between 1976 and 1988, approximately one-
quarter worked at some point during the time they received beneﬁts.
In response to the low number of SSI recipients who work, the SSA has
conducted two large-scale return-to-work demonstration projects to study
the eﬀectiveness of providing rehabilitation and employment services to
SSI beneﬁciaries. The ﬁrst, the Transitional Employment Training
Demonstration (TETD) project, which operated between 1985 and 1987,
focused on SSI beneﬁciaries whose primary condition was mental retarda-
tion. The second, Project NetWork, operated between 1992 and 1995 and
included SSDI and SSI beneﬁciaries with a wide range of diagnoses. The
two demonstration projects were run in a similar fashion. Eligible beneﬁ-
ciaries in selected cities were invited to participate in the two projects. Vol-
unteers were then randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. The
treatment groups were provided with rehabilitation and employment ser-
vices, whereas the control group was not. Using both survey and adminis-
trative data, the eﬀectiveness of the rehabilitation and employment ser-
vices could then be studied by comparing outcomes of the experimental
and control groups.
Analysis of the impact of the TETD project suggests that the employ-
ment and rehabilitation services provided to SSI beneﬁciaries signiﬁcantly
increased earnings for participants over the six years they were observed
(earnings of the treatment group were close to 70 percent higher than the
control group, roughly $4,000 in 1996 dollars), but the program only had a
small impact on average SSI payments ($870 per participant). This small
reduction in SSI payments was not nearly suﬃcient to cover the average
costs of transitional employment services for program participants
(Thornton and Decker 1989).56 However, when the employment and earn-
ings gains for program participants are weighed against the costs of pro-
viding the employment services, the program may very well have produced
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54. Section 1619 (P.L. 96-265) became law in 1986. These provisions dramatically altered
the earnings opportunities for SSI disabled adults. Section 1619(a) allows recipients to main-
tain their SSI (and Medicaid) beneﬁts even when their earnings exceed SGA. Section 1619(b)
extends Medicaid coverage to workers whose earnings make them ineligible for SSI cash pay-
ments.
55. Data on recipients who work come from SSA (2002b).
56. The net eﬀect of the transitional employment services is harder to evaluate and depends
crucially on the extent to which the services provided by the project substitute for other ser-
vices paid for by the government (Thornton and Decker 1989).a net social beneﬁt. Similar results were obtained from Project NetWork.
Analyses of the program (Kornfeld and Rupp 2000) show that during the
ﬁrst two years of operation Project NetWork produced modest net beneﬁts
to persons with disabilities, as earnings gains among participants more
than oﬀset reductions in SSI and SSDI beneﬁts. However, the small gain in
earnings was not nearly suﬃcient to oﬀset the costs of administering Proj-
ect NetWork. Moreover, data for a third-year follow-up on about 70 per-
cent of the sample show that earnings gains declined to about zero, sug-
gesting that the increase in earnings may have been temporary.
Importantly, in both cases the fraction of program eligibles who volun-
teered for either TETD or Project Network was small—roughly 5 percent
in each experiment. This suggests that, however beneﬁcial it might be to
those who participate, the provision of transitional employment services to
those on SSI who volunteer for services is unlikely to have much of an im-
pact on the overall SSI population. This is hardly surprising. As shown ear-
lier in this chapter, only a small fraction of SSI applicants were working in
the years prior to application. In addition, beneﬁciaries go through a long
process to establish that they have medical conditions that prevent them
from performing substantial gainful activity. At least at the time they ap-
ply for SSI beneﬁts, applicants would appear to have put substantial en-
ergy into becoming eligible for program beneﬁts—beneﬁts that must more
than compensate applicants both for any loss of income associated with
moving onto SSI and for the costs associated with applying for beneﬁts.57
For the great majority of those awarded beneﬁts, their health is unlikely to
improve over time and their labor market opportunities are probably dete-
riorating. Moreover, those who return to work may be subject to high mar-
ginal tax rates.58Under such adverse conditions it is not surprising that vol-
untary returns to work are rare.
2.5.2 SSI and Families of Children with Disabilities
As noted earlier, the primary justiﬁcation for awarding cash beneﬁts to
poor families containing a disabled child is that the families of disabled
children face additional economic burdens associated with their child’s
poor health (see NASI 1996). These economic burdens may include lost
earnings from a parent who provides care for the disabled child and med-
ical and nonmedical expenses related to the child’s speciﬁc disability. How-
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57. As will be discussed later in this chapter, the cost of applying for SSI disability beneﬁts
for the average applicant may be lower today than in previous periods. To the extent that wel-
fare reform has changed the SSI applicant pool, individuals may not be making a choice be-
tween work and beneﬁts but rather between other welfare and SSI.
58. The evidence we have on the extent of work activity by those who have been awarded
SSI beneﬁts comes mostly from the analysis of Social Security Earnings data. Anecdotal ev-
idence suggests that some fraction of those on SSI are actually working, but are working “oﬀ
the books.” Research targeted on such oﬀ-the-books work by SSI beneﬁciaries along the lines
of that done by Edin and Lein (1997) on welfare recipients would be valuable.ever, SSI child beneﬁts are not based on an earnings replacement or ex-
penditure oﬀset formula but, rather, are means-tested against current in-
come. It is diﬃcult to know a priori whether beneﬁciary families experi-
ence dramatic drops in labor earnings or increases in net-of-disability
expenditures in family income. In fact, it is equally possible that recipient
families have low incomes prior to the onset of the child’s disability, and
that the additional burdens placed on families with a disabled child are not
the root cause of their current ﬁnancial situation.
As with the adult SSI program, the child SSI program faces the problems
related to moral hazard—incentives for parents to have their children be-
come and remain eligible for SSI. The degree to which this potential moral
hazard causes behavioral changes with respect to gaining and maintaining
eligibility depends, to some degree, on the pre-disability economic circum-
stances of the covered families. If the typical family is a middle-income
family that experiences a dramatic decline in its economic well-being at the
onset of the child’s disability, but in all other ways has the market and so-
cial characteristics necessary to attain middle-income status, then cash
programs that only partially oﬀset these losses are unlikely to lead to ma-
jor disincentives for labor market participation or the child’s recovery.
However, if the typical family that comes onto the SSI rolls is already eco-
nomically vulnerable (e.g., family members have few market skills, it is a
one-parent family, etc.) prior to the onset of the child’s disability, eligibility
for SSI is likely to have much greater economic importance. Poor families
that have a child with a disability may be able to completely replace or even
increase their family income if their child’s disability results in the receipt
of SSI beneﬁts. Thus, pre-disability diﬀerences in economic well-being alter
the replacement rate of SSI among families of children with disabilities
and make the moral hazard of behavioral change much greater among pre-
disability low-income families than among middle- or high-income families.
Factors Aﬀecting SSI Participation
As is true for the adult disability determination process, the disability de-
termination process for children has undergone substantial revision. As
noted earlier, the most important change came in 1990 when the Supreme
Court required SSA to signiﬁcantly broaden the eligibility criteria for
childhood disability. The same year as the Zebley decision, SSA also re-
leased regulations revising the procedures used to evaluate mental impair-
ments among children. The new rules expanded SSA’s medical listings for
childhood mental impairments by adding such illnesses as attention deﬁcit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and by incorporating functional criteria in
the listings. Similar to the changes made in the adult process, SSA modi-
ﬁed the types of evidence used to judge the damage of mental illness; less
emphasis was placed on the testimony of medical professionals and more
weight was given to the information parents, teachers, and counselors pro-
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ment regulations focused on how disabilities aﬀected a child’s performance
in school.
Following these changes, the child SSI caseloads grew rapidly. Data
from the SSA show that between 1989 and 1996 the number of children un-
der eighteen receiving SSI more than tripled, from 265,000 to 955,000. Ap-
plications increased from 132,000 in 1989 to 541,000 per year in 1994, and
awards more than quadrupled. The yearly allowance rate on applications
rose from 39 percent in 1989 to a peak of 58.1 percent in 1992. In 1992, the
number of children on SSI grew by 40 percent (U.S. GAO 1998).
In response to rapid caseload growth and a burgeoning concern that the
disability determination process was allowing too many children without
serious medical problems onto the disability rolls, Congress narrowed the
criteria for childhood disability in 1996. In addition, Congress mandated
that SSA redetermine the eligibility of children on the rolls who might not
meet the new eligibility criteria because they received beneﬁts on the basis
of the former, more lenient, standards.59 In 1997, the number of SSI recip-
ients under age eighteen fell 7.9 percent and by 2001 was still 7.7 percent
below the 1996 high (see ﬁgure 2.4).
Economic factors also inﬂuence the decision of families to participate in
SSI. Evidence suggests that a large fraction of the children coming onto the
rolls in the 1990s previously participated in the AFDC program. Daly and
Burkhauser (1998), using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY), calculate that two-thirds of children found eligible for SSI
in the early 1990s were in families already receiving some type of welfare
assistance. Other things being equal, families eligible for multiple pro-
grams are likely to select those programs that provide the highest net ben-
eﬁt to them. Although additional costs are associated with SSI (e.g., more
stringent application rules, greater stigma related to receiving beneﬁts,
etc.), as the beneﬁt diﬀerence between SSI and other programs increases,
more families will be willing to incur these costs to improve their economic
situation.
Kubik (1999) tests the empirical signiﬁcance of this prediction. He ﬁnds
that AFDC recipient families who successfully qualify a child for SSI ben-
eﬁts can increase family income substantially. Table 2.9(taken from Kubik
1999) shows how a family’s income can change when a child moves from
AFDC to SSI. The analysis is for two states, Maryland and Connecticut,
and demonstrates two points: (a) Families can signiﬁcantly improve their
economic well-being if someone in the family qualiﬁes for SSI, and (b) the
generosity of SSI relative to AFDC has grown over time, implying that the
The Supplemental Security Income Program 129
59. The SSA originally identiﬁed 288,000 children as potentially aﬀected by changes in the
eligibility criteria. In 1998, SSA scaled back its estimates; new estimates suggest that fewer
than 100,000 children will become ineligible for SSI (U.S. GAO 1998).incentive to transfer to the SSI program has grown. Table 2.8 shows that a
family of three living in Maryland in 1990 could have increased monthly
family income by over $3,500 if one child transferred to the SSI rolls. By
1994, this advantage had grown to almost $4,400. Since other in-kind ben-
eﬁts such as Medicaid and food stamps remained constant, the family ex-
perienced a net gain in income if the child moved from AFDC to the SSI
rolls.
A small number of empirical papers have examined the responses of
AFDC participants to changes in the SSI program, including the post-
Zebley broadening of the childhood disability criteria, and increases in the
relative generosity of SSI beneﬁts during the 1990s (see RAND 1998 for a
thorough review of this literature). Garrett and Glied (2000) examine the
impact of the Zebley decision on SSI and AFDC caseloads using the Zeb-
ley ruling as a “natural experiment,” representing an exogenous increase in
the supply of SSI beneﬁts (i.e., eligibility criteria are relaxed and more fam-
ilies are allowed onto the SSI program). They exploit the state-level varia-
tion in the diﬀerence between SSI and AFDC payments to test whether
families are responsive to increases in net beneﬁts. Their ﬁndings suggest
that families are responsive to diﬀerences in program generosity. They
found that in low-AFDC states, where the diﬀerence between AFDC and
SSI payments would be largest, about 53 percent of the new post-Zebley
child SSI cases switched from the AFDC program; nationally, only about
43 percent of new SSI child cases came from the AFDC program.
Along the same lines, Kubik (1999) examines the incentives for families
to identify children as disabled when SSI beneﬁts are more generous than
AFDC beneﬁts. Using data from the National Health Interview Survey
(NHIS) and changes in the diﬀerence in SSI and AFDC beneﬁts, Kubik
ﬁnds that reported disabilities—particularly mental impairments—were
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Table 2.9 AFDC and SSI Beneﬁt Levels for Maryland and Connecticut, 1990 and 1994 
(in dollars)
AFDC Beneﬁt AFDC Beneﬁt Federal Net SSI
for Family for Family Diﬀerence SSI Beneﬁt
of Three of Two ([1] – [2]) Beneﬁt ([4] – [3])
State (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Maryland
1990 4,872 3,804 1,068 4,632 3,564
1994 4,392 3,432 960 5,352 4,392
Connecticut
1990 6,660 5,424 1,236 4,632 3,396
1994 8,160 6,588 1,572 5,352 3,780
Source: Kubik (1999).
Notes: All beneﬁt levels are state maximums, assuming the family earns no countable income. Both
Maryland and Connecticut did not provide SSI state supplements to children during this time period.higher in low-AFDC-beneﬁt states than in high-AFDC-beneﬁt states.60
Using data from the CPS on household SSI receipt, he also ﬁnds that rela-
tively generous SSI beneﬁts (relative to AFDC payments) aﬀect SSI par-
ticipation. Kubik estimates that a 10 percent increase in SSI beneﬁt gen-
erosity increases the probability of SSI participation among families with
low education by 0.39 percentage points—a 5 percent increase in SSI par-
ticipation. Overall, Kubik ﬁnds a signiﬁcant and positive relationship be-
tween the marginal value of SSI beneﬁts and the prevalence of disability,
and receipt of SSI, among children.
Eﬀects of SSI on Work Eﬀort of Families
SSI support for families potentially aﬀects the labor market eﬀort of par-
ents. However, there is not a large empirical literature on this relationship.
Indeed, of the literature on childhood SSI, only the Garrett and Glied
(2000) and Kubik (1999) papers consider this issue. Garrett and Glied es-
timate that the Zebley decision had a signiﬁcant impact on the employ-
ment of unmarried women without a high school education. Kubik ﬁnds
similar results; examining behavior after Zebley, Kubik ﬁnds that increases
in SSI beneﬁts lowered the probability that low-education household
heads work. He estimates that a 10 percent increase in SSI beneﬁts de-
creases labor force participation of low-education household heads by
about 2 percent. The empirical evidence on the eﬀects of SSI beneﬁt levels
on parental work eﬀort after Zebley suggest that, in addition to respond-
ing to the particular health needs of a child, mothers also respond to the in-
come eﬀect present in the guarantee as well as to the high marginal tax
rates placed on their labor earnings.
2.5.3 SSI and the Behavior of the Aged
Factors Aﬀecting Participation
Researchers have oﬀered a number of hypotheses to explain the low en-
rollment in SSI among the elderly, including lack of knowledge about the
program and eligibility criteria, prohibitively expensive application costs
(e.g., time cost or cost of learning), and unobserved costs of receiving ben-
eﬁts (e.g., welfare stigma). Early work on this topic focused primarily on
the roles of welfare stigma and program knowledge on the decision to ap-
ply. Coe (1985) reported that of the SSI nonparticipants classiﬁed as eligi-
ble (48 percent of all eligible individuals), a signiﬁcant fraction were not
aware of the program or did not think they were eligible. Coe also found
that beneﬁt levels were positively and signiﬁcantly related to participation,
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60. To account for state-speciﬁc factors that may aﬀect the prevalence of disability, Kubik
examines this relationship before and after Zebley. Thus, he measures the change in the preva-
lence of reported disability and compares it to the change in the diﬀerence between SSI and
AFDC beneﬁts by state.with each $10 in additional beneﬁts resulting in a 2.4 percentage point in-
crease in the probability of participation. This is consistent with the notion
that relatively high beneﬁt levels would outweigh any noninformational
barriers to participation, such as access costs. However, Coe notes, nonin-
formational barriers accounted for only 25 percent of the negative eﬀect of
low beneﬁts on participation. The primary reason lower beneﬁt levels de-
creased participation was that eligible individuals facing low beneﬁt levels
were more likely to believe that they were not eligible to participate. War-
lick (1982) also concluded that program information and the diﬃculty of
the application process were the primary reasons for low participation
rates among the eligible elderly.
Recent work by McGarry (1996) draws a slightly diﬀerent conclusion.
McGarry extends previous research by using detailed asset and income in-
formation from the 1984 Survey of Income and Program Participation to
more accurately classify eligibility by accounting for diﬀerences in beneﬁt
levels introduced by state supplementation, and by explicitly controlling
for measurement error in the estimation process. McGarry concludes that
the participation decision is primarily determined by the ﬁnancial situa-
tion of eligible individuals. She ﬁnds that although all persons eligible for
SSI are poor, the probability of participation declines as the number of al-
ternative resources increases. Similar to Coe, she ﬁnds that the elasticity of
the expected beneﬁt is about 0.5 and that, after controlling for size of the
SSI payment, those with greater resources are less likely to participate.61
McGarry departs from previous research in ﬁnding little evidence that
welfare stigma or informational program costs aﬀect participation. How-
ever, as she notes, her results must be interpreted with caution. The esti-
mated model is a reduced-form version, which includes variables likely to
aﬀect participation through more than one path. If a variable operates in
opposite directions on diﬀerent factors, its importance may be obscured.
Thus, although she argues that the negative coeﬃcient on years of school-
ing implies that lack of information does not deter participants, this result
can just as easily be interpreted as evidence of stigma associated with re-
ceiving beneﬁts (i.e., more educated individuals feel more stigma associ-
ated with receiving beneﬁts).
In general, the low SSI participation rates among the elderly remain
something of a mystery. Although there is reason to believe that some in-
dividuals are uninformed about the program or their eligibility for beneﬁts,
there is not much evidence that a large fraction of the elderly poor in need
of assistance are constrained by transactions costs. What does appear to be
the case is that eligible individuals who are close to the margin on the
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61. Coe’s measure of other resources includes only the home ownership variable. McGarry
uses a more extensive set of resource measures, including home and other asset ownership, la-
bor earnings over the year, and the ratio of income to needs.means test are less likely to participate in the program. As Coe (1985)
argued, this may be due to individuals’ misunderstanding the income dis-
regards and other program rules that determine eligibility. Thus, unless
individuals are suﬃciently below the means test guidelines, they believe
that they will be ineligible and thus do not apply. This interpretation is
consistent with McGarry’s simulation of responses given a change in ben-
eﬁt levels. McGarry examined how raising the federal income guarantee to
the U.S. poverty line aﬀected the participation of those previously and
newly eligible for beneﬁts. She ﬁnds that raising the beneﬁt level increases
the participation rates of those previously eligible by 16.5 percentage
points, from 0.534 to 0.699. In contrast, she ﬁnds that less than 30 percent
of those newly eligible under the increased income limit participate in the
program.62
Saving Behavior
Although it is well recognized that means-tested programs create incen-
tives for potentially eligible individuals to alter their behavior to ensure
qualiﬁcation, few studies have rigorously reviewed the incentives facing
elderly individuals close to the age and resource tests for SSI. Yet it is likely
that SSI program features create disincentives for working and saving as
individuals approach the age of eligibility. Neumark and Powers (1998) fo-
cus on the relation between saving behavior and SSI receipt among the eld-
erly. They argue that SSI’s inﬂuence on the saving patterns of elderly indi-
viduals should vary with the expected level of their beneﬁts and the
likelihood of receiving them. In practice, individuals with low lifetime
earnings living in high-beneﬁt states should reduce saving more than high
lifetime earners living in low-beneﬁt states. Neumark and Powers use state-
level variation in the generosity of supplemental SSI payments to identify
the eﬀects of SSI on the saving behavior of the elderly. They ﬁnd that SSI
reduces the saving of men and women nearing the age of retirement who
are likely participants in the program.
SSI and Labor Force Participation at Older Ages
There only are a handful of papers that discuss SSI and the labor force
behavior of older workers. Duggan (1984) ﬁnds that SSI has a negative im-
pact on the labor force participation of men and women over ﬁfty-four
years of age, with especially strong eﬀects for men. Powers and Neumark
(2001) investigate the role that SSI plays in exercising the early retirement
option in the Social Security program. Although Powers and Neumark
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62. McGarry (2000) simulates the eﬀects of changes in eligibility criteria on participation
and costs. She ﬁnds that extending the income guarantee for all elderly individuals to the
poverty line has the largest impact. Modiﬁcations to SSI that increase income disregards or
eliminate the asset test or base income eligibility are less costly but also have less of an impact
on poverty.ﬁnd only weak empirical evidence that eligibility for SSI beneﬁts positively
inﬂuences early retirement decisions, these eﬀects may increase in coming
years. The normal retirement age for receiving Social Security beneﬁts is
now in the process of increasing from sixty-ﬁve to sixty-seven over the next
ﬁfteen years, increasing the value to those eligible of the SSI bridge, espe-
cially for those in very poor health.
2.6 Summary and Conclusions
The enactment of the SSI program in 1972 was the culmination of a four-
year debate over a much more overarching welfare reform—a federally
funded minimum income guarantee for all Americans. Unlike Nixon’s FAP
proposal, SSI was targeted on the subgroup of low-income individuals
“not expected to work.” Since then, SSI has grown dramatically, with the
composition of SSI beneﬁciaries shifting toward adults and children with
disabilities.
How one views the increases in the SSI disability population is largely in-
ﬂuenced by one’s view of the social purpose of SSI. For those who see SSI
as an incomplete substitute for a universal guaranteed income program like
the NIT, expansions in the SSI program are seen as appropriate because
they bring the United States more into line with most Western European
countries that provide such a universal minimum social safety net for all
their citizens. However, for those who are worried about the long-term
eﬀects of a lifetime on government transfers, the rise in the prevalence of
disability transfer recipients—particularly among poor children and
younger adults—is of more concern.
Whatever perspective one takes, however, as the population on SSI
changes and the group of those not expected to work narrows, the struc-
ture of SSI comes into question. As we have shown, the SSI population has
dramatically shifted over time. It is now dominated by children and young
adults with disabilities. To date, despite some attempts to oﬀset the nega-
tive work incentives in SSI (section 1619), exits from SSI to employment,
even among this younger population, have been rare. As shown earlier in
this chapter, for individuals and families receiving SSI and other transfer
program beneﬁts the marginal tax rates can go from 50 to near 100 percent
at relatively low earnings levels. Although such high tax rates and relatively
generous guarantees make sense for populations not expected to work, in
a population where work is possible, they seriously discourage work.
Hence, for those with a capacity to work, SSI, together with eligibility for
other programs, can become the “poverty trap” that the original support-
ers of Nixon’s single universal FAP program were trying to avoid.
Such concerns are particularly relevant in light of other government
policies to protect those with disabilities. Support for civil rights–based
legislation like the ADA is based on the idea that people with disabilities
134 Mary C. Daly and Richard V. Burkhausershould have equal access to employment. Supporters of this type of legis-
lation view unequal access to jobs to be a greater impediment to employ-
ment than a health impairment. Furthermore, they ask that social policy
focus on altering workplace institutions to more fully accommodate
people with disabilities. Hence, in a world of full accommodation, they ar-
gue that the disability transfer population should be zero. Fundamentally,
the current policy debate over expanding SSI transfer rolls hinges on the
role people with disabilities should play in society. Should people with dis-
abilities be expected to work or not? If yes, then policies targeting people
with disabilities—particularly the young—would be better focused on ed-
ucation, rehabilitation, job training, and accommodation than on increas-
ing or expanding transfers. Likewise, for children with disabilities, invest-
ing more time, energy, and resources in enhancing their education and
development, rather than focusing solely on supplementing the income of
their households, might be more desirable.
In general, our examination in this chapter suggests that in the absence
of a universal guaranteed income program for all Americans, the opera-
tional ﬂexibility of the categorical eligibility criteria for SSI has made the
program sensitive to both downturns in the business cycle and increases in
the pool of vulnerable people. Moreover, when the dividing lines separat-
ing the working-age adult and child populations eligible for SSI from those
eligible for other income-based beneﬁts are imprecise, as with disability,
policy changes in other welfare programs are likely to aﬀect SSI caseloads.
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